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Abstract
The United States has led the world for many decades with regard to
company disclosure rules and standards; other national company disclosure
structures are based largely on the U.S. model. In December 2013 the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) indicated that it intended to
review Regulation S-K, which contains many important rules governing listed
company reporting in the United States. This Article calls for the SEC to maintain
its comprehensive approach to corporate disclosure regulation and practice as an
essential platform for the future health of global financial markets. This Article
highlights the importance of the global leadership of the United States in this
regulatory space and the strength of its existing structure by comparing and
contrasting the periodic and continuous disclosure rules that apply to companies
listed on the major exchanges in the United States, Europe, and Asia.
I. Introduction
“Great companies exist only because they are created and safeguarded by
our institutions; and it is our right and our duty to see that they work in harmony
with these institutions. . . . The first requisite is knowledge, full and complete—
knowledge which may be made public to the world.”1
Complete, balanced, and timely listed company disclosure is vital for the
health of corporations and financial markets, sustainable and competitive
economies, and the well-being of national and global communities. The
International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) indicates that
the primary rationales for company disclosure regimes are “protecting investors[,]
ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent[,] [and] reducing

* Associate Professor, Law Faculty, Monash University. Adjunct Professor, Law School, University of
Western Australia. BCom, CA (NZ); SIE(Dip), ASIA exams (UK); LLB (Hons), PhD (Aust). The author has
participated in financial markets in various roles for more than thirty years. During this period, she has read
thousands of listed company reports and disclosures from the jurisdictions examined in this Article. For more
information on this Article’s topic, please refer to the following book to be released in November 2015: Gill
North, Effective Company Disclosure in the Digital Age (Kluwer Law Int’l, The Hague, 2015).
1. Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, State of the Union Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1901).
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systemic risk.”2 While some scholars question the rationales and net benefits of
company disclosure regimes,3 most developed nations have established
regulations requiring listed companies to report periodically and on a continuous
(or ad hoc) basis. This Article compares and contrasts the national disclosure
structures that apply to companies listed on major global exchanges in the United
States, Europe, and Asia. This Article provides individual country profiles for the
United States, Germany, the United Kingdom (the “U.K.”), Japan, and Hong Kong
that summarize the important periodic reporting, continuous disclosure rules and
obligations, and the overarching regulatory framework. This Article finds there
are many common features, but also important differences across the disclosure
regimes of the countries examined.
This Article contends that there are substantive differences between the
periodic reporting rules and practices in the United States and the rest of the
world. Regulation in the United States generally requires the following features
within listed company periodic reports:






preliminary full year reporting on Form 10-K and quarterly reporting on Form
10-Q, including financial statements;
comprehensive management discussion and analysis (MD&A) and detailed
financial notes within the periodic reports that fully comply with accounting
standards;
broadly consistent content in the preliminary final (Form 10-Ks) and annual
reports;
five year financial performance tables in the Form 10-Ks; and
regular reviews of the full year and quarterly reports by the federal securities
regulator.

Many of these features are either only partially required by other
jurisdictions or not required at all. Moreover, the gap between periodic disclosure
standards and practices in the United States and those in other jurisdictions
continues to widen.
The most striking finding from this Article’s comparative regional analysis
is the marked differences between the company disclosure frameworks in the
United States and in Europe. The U.S. periodic disclosure framework provides the
most comprehensive and regular base of listed corporate information in the world
and this information is readily available to the public.4 The position in Europe is
very different because:

2. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (2010). To focus
on key issues, this Article assumes that the IOSCO rationales are valid and that company reporting regimes
are broadly beneficial.
3. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107
YALE L.J. 2359, 2380 (1998); see, e.g., Anne Beyer, Daniel Cohen, Thomas Lys, & Beverly Walther, The
Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296 (2010).
4. The SEC is the primary federal securities regulator in the United States. The federal agency provides
public access to listed company reports and disclosures that are mandated by federal regulation from the
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System website, commonly referred to as EDGAR. See
generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/ (last visited July 1, 2015).
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quarterly reporting was recently abolished;5
there is minimal regulation governing the content and form of preliminary full
year reporting;6
the mandated notes and MD&A within the half year and preliminary full year
reports are limited and the MD&A may reference financial measures that do
not fully comply with accounting standards;7
standard forms are not required for the presentation of the narrative content
of the half year and preliminary full year results;8
long-term financial performance reporting is not obligatory in the periodic
reports;9
there is no centralized European company information repository;10 and
the level and transparency of supervisory monitoring and enforcement of
continuing disclosure listing rules appears to be minimal.

This Article argues that the continuous disclosure regimes are inherently a
weak form of disclosure regulation. First, securities exchanges have primary
responsibility for continuous disclosure regimes around the globe. Most of these
entities are deeply conflicted because the exchanges are listed corporations in their
own right. While all of the exchanges reviewed have some mechanisms in place to
mitigate commercial and regulatory conflicts, such mechanisms are only partially
effective. Second, all of the jurisdictions reviewed in this Article use a form of
“stockwatch” program11 to monitor compliance with continuous disclosure
obligations, and these automated computer programs are limited in application
and effect. Third, most of the monitoring and supervision of national continuous
disclosure regimes has shifted to identification of failures to disclose inside
information. These factors have moved the essential core of the continuous
disclosure regimes from legal frameworks, which positively and proactively
promote cultures of continuous public disclosure in the long-term interests of
corporations and the broader community, to much narrower, reactive, and
predominantly negative constructs that sometimes require only irregular and
minimal public disclosures from listed companies.
5. See Council Directive 2013/50, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 206 (EU) (amending both the European
Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC and the European Commission Directive 2003/71/EC). For more detail
on the debate in Europe on the Transparency Directive review processes, see Gill North, Listed Company

Disclosure and Financial Market Transparency: Is This A Battle Worth Fighting or Merely Policy and
Regulatory Mantra?, 6 J. BUS. L. 486 (2014).
6. The rules relating to preliminary final reporting in Europe are imposed by securities exchanges. This
Article outlines these requirements for companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange in Part III.
7. The European Parliament Directive 2013/50/EU (which amends the European Transparency
Directive 2004/109/EC and European Commission Directive 2003/71/EC) does not prescribe the form or
content of management discussion and analysis in company reports and disclosures. See Parliament Directive
2013/50/EU 206.
8. Council Directive 2013/50, art. 26, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 17 (EU) (stating that the preparation of annual
financial reports in a single electronic reporting format should be mandatory with effect from January 1, 2020,
subject to cost benefit analysis). This recommendation proposes standard form reporting for the financial
statements within periodic reports only. It does not include the accompanying management discussion and
analysis. Id.; see also Memorandum 13/544 from the European Comm’n on the Revised Directive on
Transparency Requirements for Listed Companies (Transparency Directive) – Frequently Asked Questions
4 (June 12, 2013) (on file with author).
9. Council Directive 2013/50, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 206 (EU) (does not require listed companies to include
long term financial performance reporting within any disclosures).
10. Memorandum 13/544, supra note 8.
11. A stock watch program is a software program that is used by regulators to identify security trades
that may be using “inside information” and that may, therefore, require investigation.
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Claims are made that transparency in financial markets has become a
regulatory mantra and that investors are being overwhelmed by information.12
Reviews of listed company reports and disclosures within public spheres reveal
that available company information is in practice often relatively sparse,
sanitized, and dated.13 Global financial market investment and activity is now
dominated by the largest financial institutions.14 Behind the public facade, the
main game is increasingly returning to its roots, namely who among the largest
institutional participants can win the most valued access to corporate managers
and privately obtained inside information. Many jurisdictions permit or even
encourage regular private exchanges between corporate executives and selected
institutional participants. However, this Article suggests that corporate and
financial market communication structures that predominantly rely on private
exchanges between select participants are inefficient, unfair, opaque, and
ultimately toxic.
Effective company disclosure frameworks are not easy to develop or sustain
due to the power struggles involved. Company disclosure policies and practices are
of course determined as a result of political compromise.15 Each constituency uses
democratic processes to lobby for a regulatory environment that puts it in the best
position. Many company managers prefer to retain total discretion over
communication processes and advocate for a reduction, rather than a
strengthening, of disclosure regulation.16 Large market participants use their
powerful financial positions to lobby against reforms that diminish their superior
access to company managers and information. Other corporate investors and
stakeholders call for rules to enable equal access to listed company information.
As a group, institutional investors generally hold majority stakes in listed
companies and therefore often have effective control.17 In such instances, the
company executives may elect to “manage” the company disclosure frameworks by
satisfying the demands of a small number of large institutional investors.
Incentives are also a critical element of corporate disclosure frameworks.
Public company directors and managers naturally want to present company
developments with which they are associated in the best possible light. They have
compelling monetary and other incentives to restrict or delay the public
dissemination of information, particularly when there are conflicts between
managerial and corporate interests or when the information contains negative

12. E.g., JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION MAKING: FINAL
REPORT 70-71 (2012).
13. The author reviewed company disclosures in each of the jurisdictions. She has also read and analyzed
company reports and disclosures from around the world for more than thirty years as a scholar, an
institutional analyst, and a retail investor.
14. See, e.g., Mats Isaksson & Serdar Çelik, Who Cares? Corporate Governance in Today’s Equity
Markets 28-32 (OECD Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 8, 2013), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k47zw5kdnmp-en.
15. See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM, & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY 7 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
16. E.g., JOHN KAY, supra note 12. For discussion on the commentary in John Kay’s Final Report on
company disclosure matters, and the arguments this report makes on behalf of listed companies in the UK to
support removal of quarterly reporting obligations, please refer to North, supra note 5.
17. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 66-67
(Transaction Publishers 1932).
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news.18 Large institutional participants are clearly incentivized to obtain
information privately in order to gain informational advantages vis-à-vis other
participants.19 The parties in the most vulnerable position in the power struggle
are smaller institutional investors, retail investors, and those in the community
who are or may be adversely affected by corporate developments. 20 These groups
must generally rely on public disclosures and are the least likely to get timely
access to regular and comprehensive information.21
This Article calls for a renewed commitment to public disclosure
frameworks as the primary means of corporate communication and engagement.
Individual countries and the global community need to acknowledge once again
that public scrutiny and accountability of large corporations is critical and that
public disclosure structures serve long-term national interests. To sustain broad
participation and vigorous competition in financial markets, listed company
information needs to be released through non-discriminatory public channels.
Company disclosure structures only achieve their intended purposes when
publicly available information is sufficiently regular, complete, and timely in order
to enable well-informed decision-making by all groups with a warrantable
interest, including members of the public. Strong and concerted policy
commitment to established disclosure frameworks is required, so that aspirations
and statements about financial market efficiency, fairness, transparency, and
systemic risk do not become mere platitudes.
Part II of this Article discusses the IOSCO company disclosure principles.
Part III outlines the country profiles. Part IV provides additional critique. Part V
concludes.
II. Company Disclosure Principles
IOSCO is the primary international cooperative forum for securities market
regulatory agencies. Its membership is very broad with representation spanning
ninety-five percent of global markets. The Technical Committee of IOSCO
indicates that:
periodic reports facilitate investor decision making and monitoring of the markets
by making it possible for investors to compare the performance of the same
company over regular intervals, and by enabling investors to make useful
comparisons among different companies. 22

IOSCO notes that financial information in periodic reports is the core information
around which related information such as management discussion and analysis of

18. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 345 (1979); Jill Fisch & Hillary Sale, The Securities Analysts as Agent:
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1090 (2003); Donald Langevoort, Investment
Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1041, 1044-46 (1990).
19. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 18; Fisch & Sale, supra note 18; Langevoort, supra note 18, at 1046,
1048-50.
20. See Langevoort, supra note 18, at 1046, 1048-50; Ernst Maug, Insider Trading Legislation and
Corporate Governance, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1569, 1588 (2002).
21. See Brudney, supra note 18, at 357; see also Langevoort, supra note 18; Maug, supra note 20.
22. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, PRINCIPLES FOR PERIODIC DISCLOSURE BY LISTED
ENTITLES FINAL REPORT 4 (2010).
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historical results and prospects is framed. 23 It acknowledges the need for, and
importance of, regular reporting by public companies in addition to disclosure on
a continuous basis.24
The principles of a disclosure framework that IOSCO regards as essential
can be split into two categories: (i) public access and review; and (ii) the form and
content of disclosure. The IOSCO principles with respect to public access and
review encompass the following: reports should be provided to the public on a
timely basis; the reports should be stored in a central location that facilitates
public access to the information; all investors should have equal access to the
material information contained in the periodic reports; when a company is listed
in more than one jurisdiction, the material information should be released
promptly to the relevant markets; and the reports should be filed with the relevant
regulator for review.25 The principles concerning the form and content of
disclosures indicate that: the periodic reports should contain relevant information;
the reports should be presented in a form that facilitates ready analysis of the
information; the information disclosed should be fairly presented in a clear and
concise manner; the information should not be misleading or deceptive, omit any
material information, or rely on boilerplate language; the persons responsible for
the financial statements should be clearly identified and required to state that the
financial information provided is fairly presented; and the financial reporting
internal controls should be subject to ongoing review.26
Established disclosure regulatory frameworks generally encompass some,
but not all, of the IOSCO recommended disclosure principles and features. Part
III of this Article considers these national frameworks. Country profiles outline
the significant continuing disclosure obligations that apply to listed companies,
including an introductory overview and a summary of the important periodic
reporting and continuous disclosure rules. These national profiles span a range of
geographies, including countries with the largest securities exchanges
internationally and regions that are expected to become more prominent in future
decades. The profile content is sourced from information available on public
websites upon the assumption that regulators in modern financial markets, as
well as those regulated, should operate on a broadly transparent basis.
The United States was the first country to establish comprehensive
company disclosure rules in the 1930s and it remains the global leader of corporate
disclosure standards. Hence, it is appropriate to outline its disclosure regulatory
structure and rules initially, followed by consideration of comparative regimes in
Europe and Asia.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7-28.
Id.
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III. Company Disclosure Regulation: Country Profiles
A. United States

1. Overview
The SEC is an independent federal regulatory agency that was established
in 1934 following the Great Depression.27 Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) states that:
transactions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges . . .
are effected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for
regulation and control of such transactions and of practices and matters related
thereto, including . . . to require appropriate reports.28

The SEC has primary responsibility for enforcing federal securities laws and
regulation. The agency can issue rules pursuant to specific provisions to ensure
they are effective and it can sanction, fine and otherwise discipline market
participants that violate federal securities laws.
Securities exchanges in the United States operate largely as self-regulatory
organizations, but must be registered with the SEC. A registered stock exchange
is required to comply with the rules and regulations under the Exchange Act. It
must also be able to ensure that its members comply with its rules and any
relevant statutory provisions. Thus, an exchange is responsible for ensuring its
members satisfy the listing criteria and continue to comply with the exchange
rules, including the disclosure obligations. The largest securities exchange in the
United States (and in the world) by market capitalization and trade value is the
New York Stock Exchange Euronext (“NYSE”).29 Most of the largest companies
and many medium sized companies in the United States are listed on the NYSE.
Other global companies are listed on the NYSE as foreign issuers.
Within the NYSE group, a subsidiary called NYSE Regulation, Inc.
(“NYSER”) operates as an independent not-for-profit corporation. The majority of
its directors are not affiliated with any other NYSE board. 30 An Issuer Oversight
area monitors and enforces listed company compliance with the original listing
criteria and the continuing listing standards.31 It provides hyperlinks to pages
that outline noncompliant issuers and delistings. The noncompliant issuer web
page lists the name of the issuer, its symbol, a noncompliant indicator, the
deficiency, the notification date, and the relevant market.32 The noncompliant
indicators include a “.BC”, “LF”, and “BC-FC”. These terms are not explained on
the web page, but the deficiency explanations suggest that “BC” indicates a breach
of the continuing listing standards and “LF” applies where a company has not
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1934) (establishing the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission).
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Alexandr Oleinic, The 8 Largest Stock Exchanges in the World, INSIDER MONKEY (Oct. 14,
2013, 12:33 PM), http://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/largest-stock-exchanges-237624/.
30. Overview, NYSE REGULATION, INC., https://www.nyse.com/regulation (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
31. Id.
32. Noncompliant Issuers, NYSE REGULATION, INC., https://www.nyse.com/regulation/noncompliantissuers (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
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timely filed the required quarterly or annual reports with the SEC.33 The
delistings web page outlines issuers that have been removed from listings.34 These
issuers are searchable by removals from listing initiated by the Exchange for cause
and voluntary delistings initiated by the company. At the time of review, all of the
delistings on this web page were voluntary delistings.35
The NYSE regulatory home page states that the NYSER conducts “limited
real-time monitoring of trading activity on the facilities of U.S. securities as well
as market watch functions to determine whether to halt a listed security.”36 The
extent to which this real-time monitoring may lead to formal disciplinary actions
against issuers, including actions involving breaches of the disclosure listing rules,
is unclear. At the time of review, all of the actions listed on the “NYSE Disciplinary
Action” page involved the conduct of financial intermediaries.37
The Market Surveillance division of the NYSE is responsible for monitoring
securities trading activity for possible violations of federal securities laws and the
exchange trading rules. This monitoring includes real-time and post trade reviews.
The stockwatch group conducts “limited real-time monitoring of trading on the
facilities of the U.S. securities exchanges.”38 Its surveillance program flags
unusual price and volume changes above predetermined thresholds, and these
changes trigger a review by exchange staff. The extent to which surveillance and
monitoring by the exchange leads to formal enforcement against issuers is unclear.
While the NYSER enforcement web page references actions going back as far as
1972, none of those listed at the time of writing involved violations by issuers of
the disclosure listing rules.39
The compliance unit of the NYSE is responsible for ensuring compliance
with the listing rules. The exchange publishes a list of companies that are
noncompliant. It inserts a “BC” indicator over companies that are noncompliant
with the NYSE quantitative or qualitative continued listing standards and it
inserts a “LF” indicator where companies are delayed in filing the quarterly or
annual reports with the SEC. These companies are added to the noncompliant
issuer list a specified number of days after being notified by NYSE Regulation of
a deficiency or delinquency. They are removed from the list after the issue is
resolved or the company is determined to be of good standing. While the noncompliant list on the exchange web page provides a general description of the
company, details of the noncompliant conduct are not provided.40 The profiles of
the individual companies listed as noncompliant and coded BC simply indicate

33. Note, the meaning of BC-FC is unclear.
34. Removal from Listings, NYSE REGULATION, INC., https://www.nyse.com/regulation/delistings (last
visited Aug. 27, 2015).
35. Id.
36. Overview, supra note 30.
37. NYSE Disciplinary Actions, NYSE REGULATION, INC., http://www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/
1022221394131.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2015). All of the disciplinary actions involve financial
intermediaries. Suspicious activity may be referred to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
for further investigation. FINRA is an independent regulator with responsibility for writing and enforcing
rules that govern the activities of nearly 4,400 securities firms that encompass approximately 630,000
brokers. See generally FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
38. Noncompliant Issuers, supra note 32.
39. NYSE Disciplinary Actions, supra note 37.
40. Noncompliant Issuers, NYSE REGULATION, INC., https://www.nyse.com/regulation/noncompliantissuers (last visited July 15, 2015).
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that the “issuer is noncompliant with NYSE quantitative, qualitative, and/or
corporate governance listing standards.”41

2. Periodic Reports
A company defined as a “reporting company” or one that registers its
securities in the United States is subject to the periodic and reporting
requirements of Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act.42 The reporting
obligations include a requirement to file annually using Form 10-K, to file
quarterly using Form 10-Q, and to file specified events using Form 8-K.
Public companies in the United States must prepare two full year reports,
one for the SEC and another for shareholders. Form 10-K is the full year report
provided by listed companies to the SEC and federal regulation governs its form
and content. The 10-K reports must contain detailed financial and operating
information, as well as discussion of the company’s performance and operations.
The content of these reports includes financial and non-financial information and
is provided within a standard template. The reports are formatted in three parts
under standard item headings. Part I provides an overview, including a
description of the business and an outline of any legal proceedings. Part II
presents the financial statements, notes, MD&A, quantitative and qualitative
disclosures about market risk, an outline of controls and procedures, and any
disclosure changes or disagreements with the auditors. It also includes a link to
the relevant company website where additional information can be found. Part
III covers the director, executive, and professional advisor matters.
The deadlines for filing a 10-K report depend on the size of the company and
whether it is classified as a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a nonaccelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company. These classifications are
determined according to the size of the company’s public float. Large accelerator
companies with a public float of $700 million or more are required to file the 10-K
within sixty days, accelerated companies with a float of more than $75 million but
less than $700 million have seventy-five days to file, and all other companies
(including a non-accelerated filer or smaller reporting company) with a float below
$75 million have ninety days.43
Listed companies previously had some discretion over the content of annual
reports provided to shareholders. However, the SEC has gradually standardized
the disclosure framework and the differences in the two full year reports are now
minimal. The annual reports must contain certified financial statements and
specified items. The certified financial statements include audited balance sheets
for two years and audited statements of income and cash flow for three years. The
annual reports must also provide five-year summary financial data, including net

41. E.g., General Steel Holdings, Inc., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., http://www.nyse.com/listed/gsi.html (last visited
July 15, 2015).
42. A company may register its securities under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(b) or 12(g).
Companies with more than $10 million in assets whose securities are held by more than 500 shareholders
must file annual and other periodic reports. Id.
43. Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.htm (last modified June
29, 2009).
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sales or operating revenues, income or loss from continuing operations, total
assets, long-term obligations, and cash dividends declared and paid.44
Listed companies in the United States are required to provide
comprehensive quarterly reports (Form 10-Q). The Form 10-Qs are formatted in
two parts; part one contains financial information and part two contains other
information. The financial information includes condensed financial statements,
MD&A of the financial conditions and results, and disclosures on market risks.
The deadlines for filing the 10-Q reports also depend on the size of the company.
Companies with a public float of $75 million or more are required to file the 10-Q
within forty days, and companies with a float below $75 million have forty-five
days.45
Non-financial disclosures such as MD&A have been recognized as an
important component of company reporting in the United States for many years.
Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires listed companies to include extensive MD&A
in the full year (10-K) and quarterly reports (10-Q).46 The mandated MD&A
includes commentary on the company’s financial condition and operational results
and a description of the business including the main products and services. The
reports must include outlines of the critical accounting policies,47 and information
on liquidity, capital resources,48 operational results,49 favourable or unfavourable
industry trends, significant events or uncertainties, off-balance sheet
arrangements,50 and contractual obligations. Forward-looking disclosures are also
required for “known trends, demands, commitments, events or uncertainties” in
relation to these matters.51 The stated objectives of these MD&A requirements
are:
(1) to provide a narrative explanation of a company’s financial statements that
enables investors to see the company through the eyes of management, (2) to
enhance the overall financial disclosure and provide the context within which
financial information should be analyzed, and (3) to provide information about the
quality of, and potential variability of, a company’s earnings and cash flow, so that

44. Id.; see also Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. Part 210 (2015); Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (2015).
45. Form 10-Q, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10q.htm (last modified Sept.
2, 2011).
46. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.303 (2005); see Interpretation: Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Conditions and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 33-8350, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-48960, FR Release No. 72 (Dec. 19, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm.
47. Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure about Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release
No. 33-8040, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45149, FR Release No. 60 (Dec. 12, 2001), available at
https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8040.htm.
48. Disclosure Relating to Liquidity and Capital Resources, Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Trading
Activities and Related Party Transactions, Securities Act Release No. 33-8056, Exchange Act Release No. 3445321, FR Release No. 61 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8056.htm.
49. SEC Interpretation: Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 33-6835, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-26831, FR Release No. 36 (May 18, 1989), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/336835.htm.
50. Final Rule: Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 33-8182, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-47264, FR Release No. 67 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/338182.htm.
51. Cathy Cole & Christopher Jones, Management Discussion and Analysis: A Review and Implications
for Future Research, 24 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 135, 138-39 (2005).
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investors can ascertain the likelihood that past performance is indicative of future
performance.52

The SEC operates a centralized depositary system for listed company
documents provided under federal law. Companies must file the mandated reports
and disclosures with the SEC using its Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and
Retrieval System (EDGAR). The EDGAR website enables public access to filed
company documents.53 The documents available from the EDGAR website include
the full year reports (10-K and annual), quarterly reports (10-Q), prospectuses,
event disclosures (Form 8-K), and press releases submitted to the SEC. The
EDGAR website allows tailored searches by company name, type of document,
date, and industry code.54
The SEC proactively supports the disclosure framework by providing
companies with guidance on how to meet their disclosure requirements and satisfy
the MD&A rules and objectives.55 It also actively monitors and supervises the
disclosure processes. Section 408 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires the
SEC to review a company’s periodic reports at least once every three years. 56 The
SEC may elect to do a full cover-to-cover review, a financial statement review, or
a targeted issue review. When the SEC believes a company can improve its
disclosure, it issues a “comment letter.”57 The company may respond by letter (a
“response letter”) or, if appropriate, may amend its filings. SEC comments and
company responses are made available on the EDGAR website after the review is
completed. When required, the SEC uses its enforcement powers. It has a track
record of successful enforcement actions across the full spectrum of periodic
disclosure rules, including those pertaining to preliminary full year reporting (10K) and quarterly reporting (10-Q),58 and the MD&A content within these periodic
reports.59
Some of the company disclosure rules in the United States are currently
under review. The SEC was mandated by Congress in the 2012 Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act60 to report on its disclosure rules for U.S. public
52. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K 42
(2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf.
53. Filings and Forms, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last modified Feb.
21, 2012).
54. EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html
(last visited July 15, 2015).
55. Interpretation: Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion, supra note 46; see also
Sample Letter Sent to Public Companies on MD&A Disclosure , U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/fairvalueltr0308.htm.
56. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 408, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
57. Comment Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/commentletters.htm (last
modified Apr. 11, 2011).
58. Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/friactions.shtml (last modified July 8, 2015) (detailing many actions
taken by the SEC relating to the content of quarterly reports (Form 10-Q) and preliminary reports (Form 10K)).
59. E.g., Bank of Am. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 72888 (Aug. 21, 2014), available at
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34-72888.pdf; Sony Corp. & Sano, Exchange Act Release No. 40305
(Aug. 5, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3440305.txt; Bank of Bos. Corp., SEC Initial
Decision Release No. 81, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-8270 (Dec. 22, 1995), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/id81bpm.txt.
60. Jumpstart our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat. 306 (2012);
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(19) (amended 2010) (noting that the specific mandate is to
analyze the “registration requirements” of Regulation S-K).
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companies, as a means to “modernize and simplify disclosure requirements and
reduce compliance costs for emerging growth companies.”61 To achieve these aims,
the SEC issued a Staff Report entitled Report on Review of Disclosure
Requirements in Regulation S-K that documents the developments of Regulation
S-K.62 Regulation S-K was created in 1982 to provide an “integrated disclosure
system” of the registration statement disclosure requirements under the
Securities Act and the periodic reporting disclosure rules under the Exchange
Act.63 The Staff Report concludes that Regulation S-K should be comprehensively
reviewed.64

3. Continuous Disclosure
Continuous disclosure obligations in the United States are imposed on
listed companies under exchange listing rules. As the NYSE is the largest and
most prominent global exchange, its rules are outlined in more detail than those
in subsequent country profiles.
Section 2 of the NYSE Listing Manual governs the disclosure and reporting
of material information. It states that the listing agreement generally seeks to
achieve the following objectives:






“Ensure timely disclosure of information that may affect security values or
influence investment decisions, and in which shareholders, the public and the
Exchange have a warrantable interest.”65
“Ensure frequent, regular and timely publication of financial reports prepared
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.”66
“Provide the Exchange with timely information to enable it to efficiently
perform its function of maintaining an orderly market for the company’s
securities, to enable it to maintain necessary records and to allow it the
opportunity to make comment as to certain matters before they become
established facts.”67
“Preclude certain business practices not generally considered sound.”68

More specifically, NYSE Listing Rule 202.05 requires timely disclosure of
material news developments. It provides that:
A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or
information which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market
for its securities. . . . A listed company should also act promptly to dispel unfounded
rumors which result in unusual market activity or price variations. 69

61. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Staff Report on Pub. Co. Disclosure, (Dec. 20,
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540530982#.VGF5d
ckrgek.
62. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 52.
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id. at 104.
65. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MANUAL, sec. 201.00 (Introduction), available at
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F3%5F2%5F6&manu
al=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F (last visited July 15, 2015).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. sec. 202.05.
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The Listing Rule 202.05 commentary confirms that “this is one of the most
important and fundamental purposes of the listing agreement which the company
enters into with the Exchange.”70 Importantly, the wording of Listing Rule 202.05
and the introduction to section 2 of the NYSE Listing Manual indicate that the
audience of listed company disclosures includes “the public”, thereby
acknowledging the breadth of persons with a warrantable interest.71
Additionally, the NYSE Listing Rule 202.06 notes that:
Unfavorable news should be reported as promptly and candidly as favorable news.
Reluctance or unwillingness to release a negative story or an attempt to disguise
unfavorable news endangers management’s reputation for integrity. Changes in
accounting methods to mask such occurrences can have a similar impact. 72

The explicit wording of Listing Rule 202.06 indicates that the NYSE is fully aware
of the practical challenges and difficulties in obtaining balanced and frank public
disclosure of negative corporate developments.73 Listing Rule 202.06 discourages
the use of financial measures within the company reports and disclosures that
exclude negative components in an attempt to present the events or results in a
positive light.74 In practice, this exhortation generally refers to the use of financial
measures within the company reports and disclosures that are not prepared in
accordance with relevant accounting standards.
NYSE Listing Rule 202.02 governs the relationship between company
officials and outsiders. It states that:
Security analysts play an increasingly important role in the evaluation and
interpretation of the financial affairs of listed companies. Annual reports,
quarterly reports, and interim releases cannot by their nature provide all of the
financial and statistical data that should be available to the investing public. The
Exchange recommends that companies observe an “open door” policy in their
relations with security analysts, financial writers, shareholders, and others who
have legitimate investment interest in the company's affairs.
A company should not give information to one inquirer which it would not give to
another, nor should it reveal information it would not willingly give or has not
given to the press for publication. Thus, for companies to give advance earnings,
dividend, stock split, merger, or tender information to analysts, whether
representing an institution, brokerage house, investment advisor, large
shareholder, or anyone else, would clearly violate Exchange policy. On the other
hand, it should not withhold information in which analysts or other members of
the investment public have a warrantable interest.
If during the course of a discussion with analysts substantive material not
previously published is disclosed, that material should be simultaneously released
to the public.75

Listing Rule 202.02 reflects the real and significant tensions that arise in
corporate disclosure spheres when companies that are obliged to report publicly
also meet with analysts, investors and other stakeholders privately on a regular
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. sec. 201.00.
Id. sec. 202.06.
See id.
See id.
Id. sec. 202.02.
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basis. While the rule states that information should not be given to one inquirer
that is not given to another, it also indicates that mandated reports and
disclosures cannot provide all of the data that should be available to the investing
public. The nature of the additional data that should be publically available, but
which is not included in the mandated reports and disclosures, is not indicated or
discussed within the NYSE Listing Manual. While such ambiguities are
potentially problematic, the continuous disclosure obligations in the United States
are supported by Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD).76 Under Reg. FD,
companies, or those acting on a company’s behalf, are prohibited from selectively
disclosing material non-public information to securities industry professionals,
institutional investors, and specified other persons.77 When a listed company
chooses to disclose material information to one group of investors, the same
information must be disclosed publicly. Reg. FD applies to closed-door meetings,
conference calls with analysts, and any situation where material information is
communicated, verbally or in writing.78
Section 303A of the NYSE Listing Manual contains the corporate
governance rules. Companies listed on the NYSE must comply with most of the
corporate governance standards.79 These mandated requirements are stricter than
in other jurisdictions reviewed. In most countries, corporate governance rules
operate as a code containing broad recommendations or principles. These codes
are voluntary but when companies do not follow any of the recommendation either
partially or fully, they must explain their reasons for not doing so in the annual
report.80
B. Germany

1. Overview
In 2004 the European Commission adopted the Market Abuse and
Transparency Directives (the “Transparency Directive”).81 The Transparency
Directive applies to listed companies trading on a regulated market, and it
includes corporate disclosure obligations.82 The European Commission began a
review of the Transparency Directive in 2009.83 After a curious series of twists and
76. Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-43154 (Oct. 23, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., supra note 65, sec. 3.
80. See, e.g., FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., LISTING RULES § 7.2.3 (July 2015), available at
http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCA/LR.pdf.
81. See generally Directive 2004/109 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004
on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in relation to Information about Issuers whose
Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L
390/38); see Reinforcing the Transparency of Information About Issuers of Securities , EUR-LEX,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_transact
ions_in_securities/l22022_en.htm# (last updated May 29, 2014).
82. See Council Directive 2013/50, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 206 (EU) (amending both the European
Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC and the European Commission Directive 2003/71/EC).
83. See generally European Comm’n Staff, Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment (European
Comm’n, Working Paper, 2011), available at http://www.parliament.bg/pub/ECD/111764SEC_2011_1280
_EN_DOCUMENTDETRAVAIL_f.pdf. The Mazars Group was chosen by the European Commission to review
“the functioning of certain requirements imposed on listed companies by the Transparency Directive.”

Vol. 3, Summer 2015

200

National Company Disclosure Regulatory Frameworks
turns, the European Commission amended the Transparency Directive in October
2013.84 The amendments to the Transparency Directive abolish the requirement
to publish interim management statements or quarterly reports, and extend the
deadline for the publishing of half-yearly reports to three months after the end of
the reporting period.85
The prior Transparency Directive was a “minimum harmonisation
directive” which allowed the European Union (the “E.U.”) Member States to
impose additional requirements. Surprisingly, the amended Transparency
Directive prohibits Member States from imposing a requirement in their national
legislation to publish periodic financial information more frequently than on a
half-yearly basis.86 Member States are only permitted to require companies to
publish additional financial information if compliance with the request is not
financially burdensome and the information is proportionate to factors influencing
investment decision-making.87 The Transparency Directive amendments came
into force on November 26, 2013 and Member States have two years to implement
the changes.88 The stated rationale for the amendments is to “make regulated
markets more attractive to small and medium issuers raising capital in the
Union.”89 It is claimed that the obligations to publish interim management
statements encourage short-term performance and discourage long-term
investment, thereby representing “an important burden . . . without being
necessary for investor protection.”90
There is no centralized public repository of listed company disclosures in
Europe.91 Regulated information must be disseminated using processes that
ensure the information is accessible to “as wide a public [audience] as possible”
and with the timing of its release across Europe “as close to simultaneously as
possible.”92 However, the Amending Directive notes that access to financial
information on listed companies is difficult because this requires interested
parties to go through twenty-seven national databases.93 It indicates that the

Transparency Directive Assessment Report, MAZARS GRP., http://www.mazars.co.uk/Home/News/Ourpublications/General-publications/Transparency-Directive-Assessment-Report (last visited July 1, 2015).
84. Council Directive 2013/50, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 206 (EU); see North, supra note 5 (providing more detail
regarding the debate in Europe on the Transparency Directive review processes).
85. Council Directive 2013/50, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 206 (EU).
86. European Commission, COM (2011) 683 final 2011/0307(COD) Amending Directive 2004/109/EC &
2007/14/EC ¶¶ 5 (2011).
87. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Member States can require the publication of additional periodic financial information by
financial institutions. Moreover, a regulated market can require issuers which have their securities admitted
to trading to publish additional periodic information in all or some segments of the market. See Council
Directive 2013/50, 2013 O.J. (L 294/14) (EU).
88. Council Directive 2013/50, 2013 O.J. (L 294) (EU); see also UK Corporate Update, LINKLATERS (Nov.
20, 2013), http://www.linklaters.com/Insights/Publication1005Newsletter/Index/Pages/Transparency-Direct
ive-amendments.aspx.
89. European Commission, COM (2011) 683 final 2011/0307(COD) Amending Directive 2004/109/EC &
2007/14/EC ¶ 2 (2011).
90. Id. ¶ 4.
91. Memorandum 13/544, supra note 8.
92. Commission Directive 2007/14/EC of 8 March 2007 Laying down Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of Certain Provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency
Requirements in relation to Information about Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a
Regulated Market, 2007 O.J. (L 69) art. 12(2), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TX
T/?uri=CELEX:32007L0014.
93. Memorandum 13/544, supra note 8.
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European Commission proposes to develop technical standards to enable a panEuropean access point to regulated information.94
Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (FWB® or the Frankfurt Stock Exchange) is
the largest of Germany’s seven stock exchanges, with a turnover share of more
than eighty-five percent.95 The FWB is operated by Deutsche Börse AG, a German
public company.96 The FWB operates a tiered market, and companies that wish to
list on a European-regulated market can elect to list under either a general or
prime standard.97 In 2012, eighty-three percent of the companies listed with the
FWB were listed under the Prime Standards category.98
The Trading Surveillance Office (the “TSO”) “is an independent supervisory
body of the [FWB]” and is responsible for monitoring market activity, including
suspicious trading.99 The TSO notifies the supervisory bodies and management
boards of the exchange of any irregularities. The Sanctions Committee of the FWB
may impose fines and may exclude participants from the exchange for up to thirty
days.100
BaFin monitors listed company compliance with the Securities Trading Act
(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG) and is responsible for monitoring and
enforcing the rules governing insider trading, market manipulation, ad hoc
notifications, and financial reporting.101 The annual financial statements are
monitored for compliance with the law by the German Financial Reporting Panel
(Deutsche Prufstelle fur Rechnungslegung DPR e.V) on a random sample basis or
at the request of BaFin.102 The condensed financial statements and interim
management statements are subjected to examination with cause. Any
supervisory or enforcement measures are initiated by BaFin.103
The Exchange Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”) are responsible at state
level for supervision of the Exchange Act (Borsengesetz) including “pricing
processes, the supervision of the proper conduct of trading as well as the
investigations of violations of the Exchange Act.”104 The ESAs may impose

94. European Commission, COM (2011) 683 final 2011/0307(COD) Amending Directive 2004/109/EC &
2007/14/EC, 8.
95. The Frankfurt Stock Exchange, DEUTSCHE BÖRSE AG, https://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg/dispatch
/en/kir/dbg_nav/about_us/20_FWB_Frankfurt_Stock_Exchange (last visited July 1, 2015).
96. DEUTSCHE BORSE GRP., CORPORATE REPORT 2013 16 (2013), available at http://deutsche-boerse.com
/dbg/dispatch/en/binary/gdb_content_pool/imported_files/public_files/10_downloads/12_db_annual_reports/20
13/Annual_Report_2013.pdf.
97.
Companies may also raise capital under exchange regulated unofficial markets with an entry
standard listing. The entry standard is intended to provide small-to-medium sized companies with an easy,
fast and cost-effective way to list their shares for exchange trading.
98.
DEUTSCHE BORSE GRP., CORPORATE REPORT 2012 C2 (2012), available at http://deutsche-boerse.com
/dbg/dispatch/en/binary/dbg_nav/investor_relations/30_Reports_and_Figures/30_Annual_Reports/20_Archive
/Content_Files/Archive/Annual_Report_2012.pdf.
99.
The Proper Conduct of Trading Within the Exchanges Is Monitored by Market Surveillance,
DEUTSCHE BORSE GRP., https://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg/dispatch/en/kir/dbg_nav/about_us/20_ FWB_Frank
furt_Stock _Exchange40_Supervisory_Bodies (last visited July 1, 2015).
100. Trading Surveillance Office Hust, BORSE FRANKFURT, http://www.boerse-frankfurt.de/en/basics+over
view/monitoring/trading+surveillence+office+huest (last visited July 1, 2015).
101. See The Proper Conduct of Trading Deutsche, supra note 99.
102. Financial
Reporting
Enforcement,
BAFIN
FED.
FIN.
SUPERVISORY
AUTH.,
http://www.bafin.de/EN/Supervision/StockExchangesMarkets/FinancialReportingEnforcement/financialrepo
rtingenforcement_node.html (last visited July 1, 2015).
103. Id.
104. The Proper Conduct of Trading, supra note 99.
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sanctions on market participants in addition to those imposed by the Disciplinary
Committee and the management boards of an exchange.105

2. Periodic Reports
Pursuant to the periodic reporting provisions of the Transparency
Directive,106 the annual report must include audited financial statements, a
management report, a responsibility statement, and an auditor certificate of
registration.107 The annual report must be made available to the public within four
months of the financial year end.108 Companies are required to provide a corporate
governance report that indicates whether they have complied with the corporate
governance code.109 Companies may deviate from the code recommendations but
any deviations must be explained in the report.110
The half-year report must be made available to the public within two
months of the relevant reporting period.111 This report must contain a condensed
set of financial statements, an interim management statement, and a
responsibility statement.112 The condensed financial statements must include a
condensed balance sheet, a condensed profit and loss account, and notes.113 The
interim management statement must contain information on how the company
has performed during the period, including an explanation of material events and
transactions and their impact on the financial position of the company, and a
descriptive outline of the company’s financial position and performance during the
period covered.114
The statutory periodic reporting obligations imposed on listed companies
are enhanced by the exchange’s disclosure listing rules. A company listed on the
FWB under the Prime Standard is generally required to produce half-year and
quarterly financial statements in German and English in accordance with
international accounting standards.115 These reports must be provided to the
Management Board electronically within three months of the end of the reporting
period.116 These companies must provide an updated financial calendar on their
Internet websites in German and English, including the dates of the annual
105. Id.
106. See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpH] [German Securities Trading Act], July 26, 1994, Federal Law
Gazette § 37v–37z (Ger.)
107. Id. § 37v(2).
108. Id. § 37v(1).
109. GOV’T COMM’N, GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § 2.3.1 (as amended June 18, 2009), available
at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cg_code_germany_june2009_en.pdf.
110. Id. at 2-3.
111. Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpH] [Securities Act], July 26, 1994, Fed. Law Gazette § 37w(1) (Ger.).
112. BAFIN FIN. SUPERVISORY AUTH., ISSUER GUIDELINE 232 XIV.4.1 (May 14, 2009), available at
http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Leitfaden/dl_Emittentenleitfaden_2009_en.pdf?__blob=publ
icationFile.
113. Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpH] [Securities Act], July 26, 1994, Fed. Law Gazette § 37w(2) (Ger.).
114. Id. § 37x(2). The provisions relating to interim management statements were still in force when the
legislation was viewed on April 7, 2015.
115. See FRANKFURTER WERTPAPIERBÖRSE, EXCHANGE RULES FOR THE FRANKFURTER WERTPAPIERBÖRSE
§ 51 (Dec. 16, 2013), available at https://deutsche-boerse.com/dbg/dispatch/en/binary/dbg_nav/metanavi
gation /30_Regulations?object_id=84XHGZ360NSGDEN.
116. Id. An issuer that “has its offices in a non-EU country or outside a contractual country of the Treaty
on the European Economic Area . . . [must] submit the half yearly and quarterly financial statements to the
Management Board in electronic form within three months after end of the respective reporting period.” Id.
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general meeting, the press conferences, and analysts’ meetings.117 These
companies are also required to conduct an analysts’ meeting at least once a year
in order to “announce the figures from the annual accounts.”118

3. Continuous Disclosure
The ad hoc disclosure requirements in the European Commission are
intended to provide all participants with access to key information and to prevent
insider trading.119 In Germany these obligations are enacted in section 15 of the
WpHG, which requires companies that are listed on a Regulated Market to publish
inside information that is materially price sensitive without undue delay.120
These notifications must be released through an electronic information
dissemination system and the media.121
The listing rules of an exchange may impose higher disclosure standards.
For example, a company listed on the FWB under the Prime Standard must
provide the ad hoc disclosures in both German and English.122
B. The United Kingdom

1. Overview
The London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) operates a tiered public market
structure. The Main Market exists for more established and larger companies,
whereas the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) operates for small and medium
sized enterprises,123 and the Depositary Receipt Scheme enables international
companies outside of the European Union to list and raise capital.124 The
disclosure requirements of AIM-listed companies are less onerous than those that
apply to the Main Market.125
The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) is empowered to act as the U.K.
Listing Authority (“UKLA”).126 The UKLA is responsible for supervision and
enforcement of the LSE listing rules, including the reporting and disclosure
rules.127 The FCA Handbook includes a block entitled “Listing, Prospectus and
Disclosure United Kingdom Listing Authority rules”.128 The “Disclosure Rules and
Transparency Rules” (“DTR”) are provided in seven chapters. Chapter 2 governs
117. See id. § 52.
118. Id. § 53.
119. BAFIN FIN. SUPERVISORY AUTH, supra 112, at 45 IV.1.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 74 IV.6.1.1.
122. FRANKFURTER WERTPAPIERBÖRSE, supra note 115, § 54.
123. LONDON STOCK EXCH., A GUIDE TO AIM 4 (2010), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com
/companies-and-advisors/aim/publications/documents/a-guide-to-aim .pdf.
124. LONDON STOCK EXCH., A GUIDE TO LISTING DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS 6 (2009), available at
http://www.lseg.com/sites/default/files/content/documents/guide_to_listing_depositaryreceipts.pdf.
125. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., supra note 123, at 60-64.
126. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 80, § 1.1.1.
127. Id. The prior Financial Services Authority was split into the Financial Conduct Authority and the
Prudential Regulation Authority on April 1, 2013. See History of the FCA, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH.,
http://www.fca.org.uk/about/history# (last modified Jan. 28, 2015).
128. The Full Handbook, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA (last visited July
1, 2015).
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disclosure and control of inside information by issuers, Chapter 4 details the
periodic reporting rules, Chapter 6 deals with continuing obligations and access to
information, and Chapter 7 outlines the corporate governance rules.129
The FCA has broad powers with respect to potential or actual breaches of
the listing rules. It may suspend the listing of a company’s securities if required
for the smooth operation of the market or if “necessary to protect investors.”130
When a company that has issued securities fails to comply with its obligations
under Part 6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (UK), the company
or persons connected with the company may be subject to an appropriate
penalty.131 At the time of writing, no suspensions nor delistings of listed companies
for violations of the disclosure listing rules were found on the FCA website.132 The
only action on the website found concerning listed company disclosure matters
involved a failure to notify the market of share dealings by persons discharging
managerial responsibilities.133

2. Periodic Reports
The periodic reports in the U.K. include an annual financial report that
must be made public within four months following the end of a financial year.134
This report includes “(1) audited financial statements; (2) a management report;
and (3) a responsibility statement.”135 DTRs 4.1.8 and 4.1.9 state that the
management report must provide “a balanced and comprehensive analysis” of the
company’s business developments and position.136 The review must provide a
performance “analysis using financial key performance indicators,” and an
explanation of the “amounts included in the . . . financial statements” to enable
readers to understand the company developments, performance, and position.137
The type and scope of performance analysis and financial explanation are not
prescribed; there is no requirement to provide historical performance data for
years earlier than the reporting period and the prior year, and the selected
financial performance indicators may include unreported measures that do not
comply with accounting standards.138 Listed companies must include a corporate
governance statement in the directors’ report or as a separate report. 139
Companies must detail any departure from the corporate governance code and
explain the reasons.140
129. See generally FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DISCLOSURE RULES AND TRANSPARENCY RULES (Jan. 2015),
available at http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCA/DTR.pdf.
130. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 80, § 5.1.1; see Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, § 77(2)
(U.K.).
131. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, § 91 (U.K.).
132. Enforcement, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/enforcement (last
visited Jan. 31, 2015).
133. Search Results, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/list?ttypes=Final+Notice
&ssearch=listing+rules&yyear= (last visited July 15, 2015) (stating that the U.K. Listing Authority imposed
a financial penalty of 539,800 pounds on Reckitt Benckiser Group Plc.).
134. FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 129, c. 4, § 4.1.3.
135. Id. § 4.1.5.
136. Id. §§ 4.1.8, 4.1.9.
137. Id. § 4.1.9.
138. See generally id.
139. Id. c. 7, §§ 7.2.1, 7.2.9.
140. See id. § 7.2.3.
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The DTRs and Listing Rules do not require companies to release
preliminary full-year statements prior to release of an annual report.141 When
companies elect to do so, the statement must be published as soon as possible after
it has been approved by the board; the statement must be agreed with the
company’s auditors; the figures in the financial accounts must be in a form
consistent with the presentation to be used in the annual accounts; and the
statement must highlight any expected auditor issues.142 The form of the
preliminary final statement is discretionary. The content of the statement must
include “any significant additional information necessary for the purpose of
assessing the results being announced.”143 While listed companies are required to
operate a company website, there are no listing rules that require listed companies
to provide public access to briefings or to release copies of briefing presentations
or slides.
Listed companies must publish a half-year financial report within two
months after the end of the period.144 The half-year reports “must include: (1) a
condensed set of financial statements; (2) an interim management statement; and
(3) responsibility statements.”145 The required content of these disclosures is
general rather than prescriptive. The content of the half-yearly management
reports must provide a summary outline of important events and their impact on
the financial statements. They must also outline the principal risks and
uncertainties.146 The headings must be consistent with those presented in the
most recent annual financial statements,147 and additional line items are required
where their omission would give a misleading view. Comparable figures are
required for the prior year.148

3. Continuous Disclosure
The disclosure obligations that apply between reporting periods are
contained in Chapter 2 of the FCA Handbook entitled “Disclosure and Control of
Insider Information by Issuers”. DTR 2.2.1 provides that “An issuer must notify a
Regulatory Information Service (RIS) as soon as possible of any inside information
which directly concerns the issuer unless DTR 2.5.1 applies.”149 DTR 2.5.1 allows
a delay in the public disclosure of inside information when “(1) such omission
would not be likely to mislead the public; (2) any person receiving the information
owes the issuer a duty of confidentiality . . . ; and (3) the issuer is able to ensure
its confidentiality.”150 DTR 2.5.3 notes that it is legitimate to delay public
disclosure where the outcome of negotiations would likely be affected.151 In
particular, public disclosure can be delayed if it might undermine negotiations

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 80, § 9.7A.

Id.
Id.
See id. c. 4, § 4.2.2.
Id. § 4.2.3.
See id. § 4.2.7.
Id. § 4.2.5.
Id.

FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 129, § 2.2.1.
Id. § 2.5.1.
See id. § 2.5.3.
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aimed at ensuring a company’s long-term viability.152 Once information is no
longer confidential, it must be publicly disclosed. DTR 2.5.6 requires an issuer that
intentionally discloses any inside information to a third person to simultaneously
make “complete and effective public disclosure of that information.”153
C. Japan

1. Overview
One of the specific responsibilities of Japan’s Securities and Exchange
Surveillance Commission (the “SESC”) is to inspect company reports.154 The SESC
monitors financial statements and requests more detailed reports from companies
when necessary. It may caution or warn a listed company when it violates the
exchange rules, require the company to voluntarily amend its reports, or demand
the submission of an improvement report.155 The SESC also has authority to
initiate preliminary criminal investigations.156 In some instances, it may
recommend imposing a penalty and this may be taken into account in an
administrative law hearing.
Japan has six stock exchanges.157 These six organizations are selfregulatory with oversight from the SESC. The SESC is responsible for ensuring
the exchanges comply with their obligations, including their supervisory and
enforcement roles. The SESC supports the supervisory and enforcement roles of
the exchanges by independently monitoring market trends, prices, and volumes.158
Suspicious transactions are identified and investigated for possible misconduct,
including insider trading, market manipulation, and false statements.159
On January 1, 2013 Japan Exchange Group, Inc. (“JPX”) was established
via a business combination between the Tokyo Stock Exchange Group and the
Osaka Securities Exchange.160 The Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc. is a cash equities
market and Osaka Exchange, Inc. is a derivatives market.161 JPX is responsible
for monitoring its members and ensuring compliance with the listing rules and
relevant legislation.162 The self-regulatory operations at JPX are divided into two
main areas: issuer compliance and member compliance. The issuer compliance
area investigates and examines the suitability of current and potential listed
152. See id. § 2.5.2. Section 2.5.4 states “an issuer [cannot] delay public disclosure of the fact that it is in
financial difficulty or of its worsening financial condition.” Id. § 2.5.4. The permitted delay is limited to the
fact or substance of the negotiations. Id.
153. Id. § 2.5.6.
154. SEC. & EXCH. SURVEILLANCE COMM’N, REPORT ON SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE SURVEILLANCE
COMMISSION 2 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/aboutsesc/all.pdf.
155. See id. at 8-9.
156. See id. at 11. The submission of false financial statements may be a criminal offense. See id. at 9.
157. In Japan, there are stock exchanges in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Fukuoka, and Sapporo, as well as the
Jasdaq Securities Exchange. See Asian Stock Exchanges, WORLD STOCK EXCHS., http://www.world-stockexchanges.net/asia.html (last visited July 1, 2015).
158. SEC. & EXCH. SURVEILLANCE COMM’N, supra note 154, at 6-7.
159. Id. at 7.
160. About JPX, JAPAN EXCH. GRP., http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/corporate/about-jpx/about-jpx/index.html
(last modified Mar. 20, 2015).
161. Id.
162. Japan Exchange Regulation, JAPAN EXCH. GRP., http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/corporate/jpx-profile
/jpx-r/ (last modified Mar. 20, 2015).
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issuers and products.163 The member compliance area supervises trading and
ensures proper conduct in the market.164 The issuer compliance area is subdivided
into two further areas: listing eligibility and listed company compliance.
The Listed Company Compliance Department (the “Compliance
Department”) is responsible for examining listed companies’ compliance with the
disclosure regulation.165 The Compliance Department conducts examinations
regarding violations of the timely disclosure rules and deficiencies in the internal
management systems of listed companies.166 When these examinations find
evidence that a company’s systems for handling information are not adequate or
non-compliant with the rules, the JPX may warn the company, put its securities
on alert or require the company to submit an improvement report. It may also
impose a listing agreement violation penalty.167 If the company does not make
improvements within the specific period (generally within a year of designation),
it may be delisted.168 Investigation findings may also be reported to the SESC.169
The non-compliant conduct of any company against which the TSER has taken a
disciplinary measure is outlined on the exchange website to enhance corporate
disclosure standards and market transparency more generally.170 At the time of
writing, ten companies were listed on the JPX website as having violated their
listing agreement.171 In addition, twenty-five public announcement actions were
listed from January 2011 until April 2015, with many involving misstatements of
financial items.172 Finally, a steady number of reminders have been issued by the
JPX to listed companies for inappropriate disclosure during the period from 2003
to the present.173

2. Periodic Disclosure
Company reporting in Japan is governed by two legal codes: the Companies
Act and the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (the “FIEA”). The
Companies Act applies to all companies, while the FIEA is limited to public
companies.174 The Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) is responsible for
disclosures under the FIEA and the Ministry of Justice regulates disclosures
163. Outline of Self-Regulatory Operations, JAPAN EXCH. GRP., http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/regulation/
outline/index.html (last modified Mar. 20, 2015).
164. Ensuring Sound Market Operations, JAPAN EXCH. GRP., http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/regulation/
ensuring/index.html (last modified Apr. 15, 2015).
165. Listed Company Compliance, JAPAN EXCH. GRP., http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/regulation/ensuring/
listing/compliance/index.html (last modified Mar. 20, 2015).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. The Financial Supervisory Agency and the SESC were split off from the Ministry of Finance in June
1998. SEC. & EXCH. SURVEILLANCE COMM’N, supra note 154.
170. See Listed Company Information, TOKYO STOCK EXCH., http://www.tse.or.jp/english/listing/
index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
171. See Public Announcement Measure, JAPAN EXCH. GRP., http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/listing/stocks/
public-announce/index.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Companies Act, No. 86 of 2005, art. 435(2) (Japan) requires all companies to provide a business report
and non-consolidated financial statements. Larger companies are also required to prepare consolidated
financial statements. While there are differences under the two sets of regulation, the requirements have
converged following a series of revisions. See JAPANESE INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE IN JAPAN OVERVIEW 13 (6th ed. 2010).
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under the Companies Act. Listed companies must file financial statements with
the FSA, including an annual report with a statement of cash flow and an internal
control report, and quarterly reports with financial statements that have been
reviewed by a certified public accountant or an audit corporation. 175 The
Commissioner of the FSA may impose a penalty and/or require the submission of
amended financial statements.176

3. Continuous Disclosure
The continuous disclosure rules (referred to as the timely disclosure rules)
are governed by the Securities Listing Regulations (“SLR”) of the TSE.177 Rule 402
of the SLR requires companies to disclose details of specified items immediately.
The items requiring disclosure include decisions by listed companies, various
factors or events, earnings information, amendments to performance estimates,
dividend estimates or amendments to such estimates, and equivalent information
relating to subsidiaries.178 Compliance guidelines published by the TSE state that
disclosure of corporate information is examined for its timeliness, accuracy,
completeness, balance, and appropriateness.179
A company announcements service in English was established in 2011 to
enhance communications between listed companies and overseas investors, with
announcements posted on the English website of the TSE for thirty-one days.180
Use of this service by listed companies is voluntary.181
D. Hong Kong

1. Overview
The principal regulator of securities markets in Hong Kong is the Securities
and Futures Commission (“SFC”).182 The SFC is an independent statutory body
that was established in 1989 by the Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance
(“SFCO”).183 The SFC comprises four operational divisions: the Corporate Finance
Division, the Intermediaries and Investment Products Division, the Enforcement
Division, and the Supervision of Markets Division.184

175. See id. at 13-14. A quarterly reporting system was introduced in Japan in 2008. Id. at 3.
176. Id.
177. See generally TOKYO STOCK EXCH., INC., SECURITIES LISTING REGULATIONS (Dec. 1, 2014), available at
http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/rules-participants/rules/regulations/tvdivq0000001vyt-att/securities_listing_reg
ulations_20141201.pdf.
178. See generally JAPAN EXCH. GRP., CORPORATE INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR TIMELY DISCLOSURE,
available at http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/equities/listing/disclosure/tvdivq00000087hu-att/Disclosure.pdf (last
visited July 1, 2015).
179. TOKYO STOCK EXCH., GUIDELINES GOVERNING LISTED COMPANY COMPLIANCE 1 (July 16, 2013).
180. Company Announcements, JAPAN EXCH. GRP., http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/listing/disclosure/
index.html (last modified Mar. 20, 2015).
181. Id.
182. Introduction to Regulatory Framework, HONG KONG EXCH., https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/
regintro/introreg.htm (last modified Oct. 31, 2013).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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The Hong Kong Exchange (“HKEx”) “owns and operates the only stock
exchange in Hong Kong”—the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (“HKSE”).185
HKEx is a listed company and the SFC is responsible for regulating the HKEx in
relation to conflicts of interest and compliance with the listing rules.186 The HKSE
operates a Main Board and a Growth Enterprise Market (GEM).
The HKSE has a duty under Section 21 of the SFCO “to ensure . . . so far as
reasonably practicable, an orderly, informed and fair market.”187 The role of the
HKSE is closely tied to the development and growth of securities markets in
China.188 The stated mission of HKEx is to “aim to be the global exchange of choice
for our China clients and our international clients seeking China exposure.”189
Companies that are incorporated in the People’s Republic of China are listed on
the HKSE as H-share companies.

2. Periodic Reports
Companies listed on the HKSE Main Board must comply with its disclosure
listing rules. They must publish annual reports within four months of the end of
a financial year and half-year reports must be released within three months of the
end of a period.190 They must also comply with corporate governance standards
and practices, or explain why an individual corporate governance standard has
not been followed.191
Under the HKSE listing rules, the preliminary full year results must be
published within three months of the end of a financial year.192 The required
content of these reports is governed by Chapter 4 and Appendix 16 of the Main
Board Listing Rules. While the prescribed content for the interim report and
preliminary full year report is basic, companies must include a business review
section that includes “a fair review” of business developments, “details of
important events,” “an indication of likely future developments,” and “any
supplemental information . . . necessary for a reasonable appreciation of the
results.”193
185. Id. (noting that HKSE is a wholly-owned subsidiary of HKEx).
186. The SFC imposes obligations on the HKEx under Chapter 38 of the Main Board Listing Rules and
Chapter 36 of the Growth Enterprises Market Listing Rules. See Ch. 38, Listing of HKEC, Main Board Listing
Rules, HONG KONG EXCH., http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrules/vol1_5.htm (last updated
July 11, 2014); Ch. 36, Listing of HKEC, GEM Listing Rules, GROWTH ENTERPRISE MKT.,
http://www.hkgem.com/eng/rulesreg/listrules/gemrules/documents/chapter_36.pdf (last visited July 15, 2015);
see generally Memorandum from the Sec. & Futures Comm’n & Stock Exch. of Hong Kong Ltd. on
Understanding Governing Listing Matters (Jan. 28, 2003).
187. Securities
and
Futures
Ordinance,
(2002)
A231,
§
21
(H.K.),
available at
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/ord/ord005-02-e.pdf.
188. See Fanpeng Meng, A History of Chinese Companies Listing in Hong Kong and Its Implications for
the Future, 11 J. CORP. L. STUDIES 243, 265 (2011).
189. HONG KONG EXCH., HKEX GROUP STRATEGIC PLAN 2013-2015 1, https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/
exchange/corpinfo/mission/Documents/HKEx_Group_Strategic_Plan.pdf (last visited July 1, 2015).
190. See Main Board Listing Rules, supra note 186, ch. 13, §§ 13.47, 13.48 (Equity Securities – Continuing
Obligations). Notably, companies listed on the Growth Enterprise Market must publish annual and half year
reports more quickly than companies on the Main Board and these companies must publish quarterly reports.
Continuing Obligations and Fees, HONG KONG EXCH., http://www.hkex.com.hk/ENG/LISTING/LISTREQ
_PRO/CONTINUING_OBLIGATIONS.HTM (last updated May 3, 2015).
191. Main Board Listing Rules, supra note 186, App’x 16, p. 31.
192. See id. § 13.49.
193. See id., App’x 16, §§ 45(3)–(4).
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Additional MD&A is required in the annual report, including segmental
information, a risk management outline, and a corporate governance report. 194
The financial statements in the annual report “must normally be drawn up in
conformity with” one of the following three standards: Hong Kong Financial
Reporting Standards, International Financial Reporting Standards, or China
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises.195 The Hong Kong Exchange and
Clearing, Ltd. has an established annual program that reviews and reports on
company disclosures. To promote high quality disclosure standards, its disclosure
review reports provide detailed feedback and policy guidance.196

3. Continuous Disclosure
Listed companies have continuing disclosure obligations that are intended
“to ensure that all users of the market have simultaneous access to the same
information.”197 Chapter 13 of the HKSE Main Board Listing Rules outlines the
circumstances in which a company must disclose information to the public. Price
sensitive information must be publicly announced where “there is, or there is
likely to be a false market in [the company’s] securities.”198 The HKSE operates
an enquiry system that monitors and picks up unusual movements in security
prices or trading volumes.199 When the system is triggered, the relevant company
is asked to confirm whether it is in compliance with its disclosure obligations.
The continuous disclosure listing rules are supported by statutory
obligations that are imposed on listed companies and their directors to disclose
inside information as soon as reasonably practical after they become aware of the
information.200 The Enforcement Division of the SFCO conducts market
surveillance to identify possible market misconduct.201 The SFCO is also
responsible for misconduct by licensed intermediaries.202
The HKSE operates a disciplinary committee that adjudicates the breaches
of some listing rule matters.203 These disciplinary processes and associated
schedule of penalties do not appear to encompass failures to comply with the
periodic reporting and continuous disclosure listing rules. At the time of writing,
none of the actions shown on the enforcement news page of the exchange involved
periodic reporting or continuous disclosure matters.204
194. Id., App’x 16, pp. 6-21.
195. See id., ch. 14, § 4.11, App’x 13, part D.
196. See generally HKEX & CLEARING LTD., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS REVIEW PROGRAMME REPORT 2009 (June
2009); HKEX & CLEARING LTD., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS REVIEW PROGRAMME REPORT 2010 (Aug. 2010); HKEX &
CLEARING LTD., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS REVIEW PROGRAMME REPORT 2012 (Jan. 2013).
197. Main Board Listing Rules, supra note 186, ch. 13, § 13.03.
198. Id., § 13.09.
199. Id., § 13.10.
200. These obligations are monitored and enforced by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission.
See Enforcement Reporter (publication), SEC. & FUTURES COMM’N, http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/regulatoryfunctions/enforcement/enforcement-actions/enforcement-reporter-(publication).html (last updated Aug. 6,
2014).
201. Introduction to Regulatory Framework, supra note 182.
202. Id.
203. See generally Disciplinary Procedures, HONG KONG STOCK EXCH., http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rules
reg/listrules/listdisciplinarypro/disproced.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (providing links to the Disciplinary
Procedures for the Main Board and/or GEM).
204. Enforcement News, SEC. & FUTURES COMM’N, http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/newsand-announcements/news/enforcement-news/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015).
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IV. Comparative Analysis and Critique
A. Periodic Disclosure Regimes
All developed countries and many emerging markets have established
disclosure frameworks that reflect at least some of the IOSCO corporate disclosure
principles and concepts. Existing company disclosure regulation generally
includes federal or national law and exchange listing rules. This regulation is
typically monitored and enforced by the securities exchanges with support from
national or state regulators. The periodic disclosure regimes generally require fullyear reporting and either half-year or quarterly reporting. While the periodic
disclosure regimes outlined in Part III may at first glance appear similar, a more
detailed review reveals critical differences. The areas containing the most
differences and disagreements within the periodic disclosure realm include:







the timing, structure and content of full year reporting;
the regularity of periodic reporting;
the level and quality of MD&A within the periodic reports (and more
generally);
the use of, and reference to, financial measures that are not in
accordance with accounting standards within the periodic reports
(and more generally);
the use of standard form reporting; and
the provision of long-term performance measures and commentary.

These differential factors result in large variations in the quantity and quality of
publicly available corporate reports and disclosures across the globe.
A frequently stated purpose of company disclosure regimes is to enable wellinformed and timely decision-making. Accepting this goal as valid, a disclosure
framework requires publicly available corporate disclosures that are sufficiently
complete, accurate, balanced, and timely so that all diligent and competent
persons can make informed investment decisions on a broadly equal basis. All of
the jurisdictions reviewed in this Article require listed companies to publicly
release financial statements at least twice annually. All countries also require
some financial notes and MD&A within the periodic reports. However, the
mandated content in half-year and preliminary full-year reports in many
jurisdictions is generally minimal in comparison to the substantive content
provided in the preliminary full-year (10-K) reports in the United States. Indeed,
the required content is often considerably less substantive and informative than
the MD&A provided in the quarterly (10-Q) reports. Thus, in a search for best
practice initiatives within the corporate disclosure sphere, one is compelled to
start with the regulatory structure and disclosure practices in the United States.
While no country has perfect company disclosure regulation or all of the best
practice features, the periodic disclosure rules and standards in the United States
generally provide the international gold standard benchmarks.
Securities regulation in the United States expressly states that securities
transactions through exchanges are intended to serve the “national public
Vol. 3, Summer 2015
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interest.”205 This principle is reflected in the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”)
rules, which explicitly require disclosure of all materially price sensitive
information to shareholders and the public.206 The U.S. disclosure rules have
developed over time into an integrated periodic reporting framework that
encompasses the following limbs:






the United States has full-year company reporting processes that are
now effectively integrated;
it uses standard form reporting that ensures comprehensive reporting
in accordance with accounting standards;
it has had full quarterly reporting including financial statements and
notes for nearly fifty years;
it requires five-year performance tables in the 10-Ks; and
it provides an online and hard copy federal company document
repository that is free and easy for the public to use.

The SEC has managed and adapted well in this difficult regulatory space.
Among its many roles and responsibilities, it has prioritized company reporting
standards and the quality of publicly available information. It operates in a
manner consistent with the assumption that listed companies should use public
disclosure to release the same financial information and MD&A to all market
participants and interested persons at the same time. It has a good appreciation
of the appropriate level and scope of regulatory engagement required to achieve
financial disclosures that, in the author’s view, are generally clear and effective.
Its monitoring of company disclosures is systematic and regular, the exchange of
queries and answers from submitting companies are available to the public once
resolved, and enforcement actions are initiated under the full suite of federal
disclosure rules when required. The United States is likely to have benefited
economically as a nation from the strength of these regulatory processes and its
reputation for high quality company disclosure standards.
There are important differences between the company disclosure structure
in the United States and those in operation elsewhere. The structure, timing, and
content of full-year reporting in most jurisdictions outside of the United States are
especially problematic. It is confounding how the traditional company reporting
processes, which provide comprehensive and timely full-year information to only
some participants, has survived for so long. Corporate annual reports are
published in most jurisdictions up to four months after the financial year-end. By
this time, the encompassed information is generally dated and no longer price
sensitive, because institutional investors and analysts do not wait for publication
of the annual reports to update their spreadsheets, commentary, and forecasts.
As soon as a preliminary full-year result is released, these participants use it as
the updated base case within security valuation models. In order to enable credible
inputs for future years, they expect managers to provide strategic and operational
updates during the preliminary full-year reporting season, as well as detailed
notes and analysis on the recurring nature of financial line items.
205. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 4, codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1934) (establishing the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission).
206. Id.
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This detailed feedback is typically provided by managers at preliminary full-year
result briefings and at subsequent private briefings in the days following the
result release.
Some listed companies release valuable material that explains and analyses
the reported results through the relevant exchange or information repository and
on the company website. Many also enable public access to the result briefings
using webcasts and audios. While these companies and processes should be highly
commended, these open access policies are discretionary processes in most
jurisdictions. When companies do not provide public access to result briefings and
merely comply with minimum regulatory requirements, the content in the halfyear and preliminary full-year reports is sometimes limited to financial
statements—one or two pages of loosely worded management commentary and a
page of financial notes. This level and quality of public disclosure provides
inadequate content and explanation of the financial results of a company and its
prospects. It does not allow interested persons to use the mandated information to
credibly value the company’s securities and/or assess its performance on a timely
basis over the full financial year. For company disclosure frameworks to achieve
their intended purposes, listed companies need to produce and release year-end
reports that include comprehensive financial notes and MD&A. The SEC has
acknowledged this by gradually merging the required content in the 10-K and
annual reports, but other jurisdictions have not followed suit.
Any adverse effects arising from a lack of substantive information in
preliminary full-year reports are magnified when quarterly reporting is not
mandated. A six-month period is a long time for individuals relying on public
disclosures to wait for comprehensive financial statements and management
commentary and updates, particularly when the continuous disclosures are
incomplete or irregular or when the general business environment is less stable.
Listed companies in the United States have provided mandatory comprehensive
quarterly reports (Form 10-Q) since 1970. Quarterly regimes have also been
adopted in other countries, including Canada, Japan, and Singapore.
Nevertheless, the regularity, content, and form of corporate periodic reports
remain highly contentious issues in many countries.207 For example, institutional
investors in Europe sought comprehensive quarterly reporting in the period
leading up to the introduction of the Transparency Directive in 2004.208 This step
was opposed by listed companies and a compromise was reached that required
listed companies to provide interim management statements. These interim
management statements were limited to providing a general description of a
company’s financial position and performance, as well as an outline of material
events and transactions and their impact on the financial position. Despite the
limited nature of these interim statements and the generally favorable
stakeholder response concerning the operation and efficacy of the Transparency
Directive during the review consultation period, the European Commission
207. The arguments made against the introduction of quarterly reporting included the cost and undue
investor focus on short-term results. Some parties also argued that quarterly reporting in the United States
had not prevented fraud. E.g., For and Against - Cost and Benefit Study Needed 12 ACCT. AGE 12 (2003);
Europe Drops Quarterly Reporting 23 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 12 (2004); Quarterly Reporting System 27 INT’L FIN.
L. REV. 8 (2008).
208. E.g., CHARTERED FIN. ANALYSTS INST., EUROPEAN INVESTMENT PROFESSIONALS BACK QUARTERLY
REPORTING (Nov 20, 2003).
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abandoned this policy obligation in late 2013.209 From late 2015, companies listed
on European markets will no longer be required to provide quarterly reports or
updates and will have up to three months to release half-year reports.
The revised EC transparency policy does not entirely prevent Member
States and security exchanges across Europe from establishing higher corporate
disclosure standards. It will be interesting to see if Member States that previously
had relatively higher disclosure standards—including more regular, timely, and
comprehensive reporting—continue to maintain these standards. The
comparative cost of market-based capital across European financial markets
should be closely monitored, as these costs are likely to increase to compensate for
weaker disclosure standards and reduced transparency. The amendments are
intended to assist “small and medium issuers raising capital in the Union.”210 Yet
any increases in cost of capital are likely to apply most harshly to smaller entities,
as these companies are generally a riskier investment class than larger and more
established companies due to a higher probability of failure. Therefore, the logical
response by investors to the Transparency Directive amendments is an upward
adjustment in the return sought to allow for higher risk and lower transparency
levels. Over the long term, it will be important to observe any movement in
investment capital flows to corporations and markets across Europe, or to other
jurisdictions that require or provide higher quality public disclosures from listed
corporations.
Some policy makers and commentators suggest quarterly reporting is not
needed because continuous disclosure rules require listed companies to publicly
disclose material price sensitive information.211 These arguments imply that
companies are releasing all of the substantive information, which would normally
be included in comprehensive quarterly reports, within continuous disclosure
reports. Such arguments are not credible to individuals who use public disclosures
on a regular basis. It is regular and relatively standardized periodic reports that
provide the essential base information from which investors assess the episodic,
continuous disclosures. While the primary purpose of continuous disclosure
regimes is to ensure that all investors and other stakeholders are provided with
materially price sensitive information between reporting periods, these
frameworks are inherently limited with respect to the nature, scope, and
consistency of information provided. Listed companies are not obliged under
continuous disclosure regimes in any of the countries reviewed to provide financial
statements or financial forecasts (albeit some companies do so voluntarily). And
as the SEC has noted, listed company executives retain significant discretion
under continuous disclosure rules in relation to what must be, and in practice what
is, disclosed publicly and additional information that is permitted to be, and is in

209. Council Directive 2013/50, 2013 O.J. (L 294) 206 (EU).
210. Id.; Directive 2004/109 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the
Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in relation to Information about Issuers whose Securities are
Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390/38);
Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the Prospectus
to be Published When Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and amending Directive
2001/34/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 345/64) ¶ 2.
211. See Memorandum 13/544, supra note 8, at 2; see also COS. & SEC. ADVISORY COMM., COMMONWEALTH
OF AUSTL., REPORT ON CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE 6 (1996).
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fact, disclosed privately to some market participants.212 In reality, continuous or
ad hoc company information is only useful to investors and stakeholders when it
is timely and sufficiently integrated with the content provided in periodic reports,
so that it forms a complete, consistent, and clear mosaic of available information.
Furthermore, publicly available company information should be in a form
that allows comparative analysis. The need for company reporting in a way that
enables investment comparability has long been accepted and promoted by global
regulators. For example, the IOSCO indicates:
periodic reports facilitate investor decision making and monitoring of the markets
by making it possible for investors to compare the performance of the same
company over regular intervals, and by enabling investors to make useful
comparisons among different companies.213

The United States uses periodic reporting templates, with Form 10-K for
preliminary full-year reporting and Form 10-Q for quarterly reporting. These
standard templates provide benefits for senior executives who complete them and
for readers of the reports. The 10-Ks and 10-Qs require companies to fill in and
address all of the form sections (including commentary on the recurring and nonrecurring elements of the reported result), thereby ensuring comprehensive and
uncluttered information is presented on a consistent basis each reporting period.
Relevant information can easily be located from these forms because the reports
contain an electronic table of contents, have standardized headings, are formatted
in self-contained online pages, and do not contain pictures. In addition, all of these
mandated reports can be readily accessed and downloaded by all interested parties
from EDGAR.214 This standardized reporting framework outlines and explains
company financial, operational, and strategic outcomes and developments,
enabling all parties with a warrantable interest to engage in comparative analysis
of individual companies, sectors, and financial markets.
Most countries, exclusive of the United States, require companies to include
some MD&A in the relevant preliminary full-year, half-year and quarterly reports.
Nonetheless, the required MD&A is often phrased in broad terms, allowing
companies significant discretion over the content and form of the publicly available
reports. While such frameworks enable companies to report in a manner they
consider most appropriate, a lack of formal structure and prescribed content can
present major difficulties for readers. Issues that commonly arise include a lack of
important notes and MD&A in the disclosures, MD&A that is poorly connected to
the financial statements or that is written to present results in a positive light, the
inclusion of lots of pictures that are expensive to print and that dilute the core
message, large inconsistencies in the form and content of MD&A provided from
period to period by individual companies, and marked differences in the form and
content of MD&A and financial notes across sectors and the general market.215
212. Proposed Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7787,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-42259 (Mar. 29, 2000), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-422
59.htm.
213. TECHNICAL COMMITTEE, supra note 22.
214. Filing & Forms, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM., http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
215. E.g., CANADIAN SEC. ADMINISTRATORS, STAFF NOTICE 51-339: CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE REVIEW
PROGRAM ACTIVITIES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED MAR. 31, 2013 11-13 (July 18, 2013); HKEX & CLEARING LTD.,
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS REVIEW PROGRAMME REPORT 2012 11 (Jan. 2013).
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Such variability in listed company reporting makes it difficult, and sometimes
impossible, for persons relying on public disclosures to engage in meaningful
comparative or performance analysis. In worst case scenarios, the publicly
available reports are presented as marketing documents, with a large number of
glossy photos, without comprehensive and tailored outlines of the company’s
strategies, risks, and plans; without substantive discussion and analysis; and
without compliant or useful financial measures and commentary that explain the
company’s short-term and long-term performance and trends.
B. Continuous Disclosure
As highlighted, continuous disclosure obligations support the periodic
reporting regime by requiring companies to keep investors informed of any
materially price sensitive information between reporting periods. The underlying
principle of these regimes is that all investors should have access to this
information at the same time, so that trading in the relevant securities takes place
by informed participants. While most jurisdictions acknowledge the critical
importance of continuous disclosure regulation and practice, global forums and
individual countries face significant challenges when seeking to embed or promote
a resilient culture of continuous public disclosure. The natural tendency when
discussing company disclosure regulation is to narrow the debates and reform
agendas to matters involving technical compliance. When this occurs, the intended
purposes of the regulation can sometimes be glossed over or forgotten.
While the capacity of regulators to supervise and enforce company
disclosure regimes is essential to a meaningful disclosure framework, continuous
disclosure has always been a difficult area for regulators. It is the securities
exchanges that generally have front line responsibility for monitoring compliance
with continuous disclosure rules, and since the late 1980s, most of these exchanges
have listed as for-profit self-regulatory organizations.216 Most continuous
disclosure regimes are therefore supervised and enforced by exchanges that are
themselves listed on the market they regulate. While the major exchanges have
separate legal entities that are responsible for supervision, the group exchange
executives still owe conflicting duties and are not always well motivated to enforce
the disclosure listing rules. A Singapore Exchange Limited website previously
explained:
the profit motive of a demutualised exchange creates a natural tension between its
regulatory responsibilities and duty to the public, and its shareholders. This
natural tension gives rise to . . . conflict issues. . . . A mutual exchange needs to
balance the interests of its “member-owners” with the interests of the investing
public in their decision-making and rule-making.217

Scholars have examined federal regulatory structures on varying bases,
including consideration of the size and funding of individual regulators and the

216. See WORLD FED’N OF EXCHS., 2009 COST AND REVENUE SURVEY 5 (Oct. 2010).
217. Rule Making and SRO, SING. EXCH., LTD. (June 7, 2012), http://www.sgx.com/wps/wcm
/connect/cp_en/site/regulation/rulemaking_and_sro/Rulemaking+and+SRO+Page?presentationtemplate=desi
gn_lib/PT_Printer_Friendly.

Vol. 3, Summer 2015

217

Global Markets Law Journal
number of enforcement actions initiated.218 An area that has received less focus is
the efficacy of stock exchanges as monitors and enforcers of disclosure listing rules.
The SEC noted in 2004 that failings or perceived failings with respect to listed
securities exchanges fulfilling their self-regulatory obligations had sparked public
debate as to the efficacy of the regulatory processes.219 Concerns about the extent
and quality of exchange oversight are enhanced by ongoing developments such as
the fragmentation of financial markets, the growing number of alternate trading
platforms, increasing levels of high frequency trading, and decreasing supervisory
budgets.220 Securities exchanges are becoming increasingly dependent on trading
fees from the largest financial institutions and high frequency traders to survive
and prosper. Consequently, at a time when increased surveillance of activity is
needed to enhance market transparency, minimize market misconduct, and
reduce systemic risk, the profit sources of exchanges are under pressure,
potentially undermining their role as effective regulators and enforcers of
company disclosure matters.
The monitoring and enforcing of company disclosures by some of the
exchanges appear to be limited. The powers of most are restricted to suspension
or cancellation of listings, and as these actions constitute extreme measures, they
are rarely used, particularly in relation to large companies.221 Not many of the
securities exchanges operate formal disciplinary procedures that encompass
company disclosure matters, and most do not have the power to apply deterrent
measures such as public censures and fines. Consequently, even if the exchanges
choose to become more active in supervising and enforcing disclosure listing rules,
the mechanisms for doing so may be limited.
The exchange regulatory entities and national regulators are increasingly
using the same empirical processes to detect possible insider trading as those used
to monitor compliance with continuous disclosure obligations. Global continuous
disclosure regimes were previously related to, but distinct from, insider trading
rules; however, the lines between these regimes have blurred over the last decade.
These developments are problematic because they change the supervisory and
disclosure cultures and frameworks in a subtle, yet profoundly, important way.
Continuous disclosure regimes require listed companies to disclose material
information as a positive, proactive, and broad obligation. By contrast, insidertrading regulation applies after the relevant event, any losses to uninformed
traders or shifts in wealth between groups of investors have already occurred,
enforcement actions are generally initiated as criminal prosecutions against
individuals, and enforcement actions are generally motivated by deterrence rather
than compensation.222 Therefore, relative to continuous disclosure obligations, the
nature of insider trading regulation is negative, reactive, and narrowly focused.
218. E.g., Howell Jackson & Mark Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: ResourceBased Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2009).
219. Proposed Rule: Self-Regulatory Organizations—Various Amendments, Exchange Act Release No. 3460699 (Dec. 8, 2004); see generally Peter DeMarzo, Michael Fishman, & Kathleen Hagerty, Self-Regulation
and Government Oversight, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 687 (2005); Karessa Cain, New Efforts to Strengthen
Corporate Governance: Why Use SRO Listing Standards?, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 619 (2003) (finding that
exchanges rarely deny listings as a means to signal their quality reputation).
220. E.g., Tom C. W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678 (2013).
221. See Adam Pritchard, Self Regulation and Securities Markets, REG. 32 (2003).
222. Insider trading enforcement actions initiated by national regulators do not typically provide
compensation to investors who may have suffered losses as a result of the insider trading.
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The essential elements of continuous disclosure rules are timeliness and
materiality, but these elements are difficult for outsiders to test or examine
empirically, particularly when materiality is defined narrowly or ambiguously.
Company information in the United States is generally considered material if
there is a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total
mix’ of information made available.”223 BaFin, the German federal regulator,
indicates that an assessment of whether company information is materially price
sensitive involves two steps. The first step requires an ex ante assessment of
whether the information in and of itself is reasonably likely to have a significant
effect on prices at the time the decision was made.224 The second step requires
consideration of all of the specific circumstances existing or foreseeable at the time
the decision was made.225 BaFin confirms that the test is whether a reasonable
investor who is aware of all publicly available information would consider that
there is a “reasonable likelihood of a significant impact on prices.”226 It indicates
that it is “irrelevant whether the price of an insider security actually changes after
the inside information has become publicly known.”227 Thus, in some of the
jurisdictions reviewed, the materiality test is legally determined by means of a
“reasonable person” test at the time of the relevant event.
In practice though, day-to-day monitoring of company disclosures by the
exchanges and other regulators is increasingly reliant on stockwatch programs
that review historical trading patterns to identify possible suspicious trading. 228
All of the jurisdictions reviewed operate stockwatch programs. Some also use price
query processes that, when triggered, send a letter to the relevant company asking
it to confirm whether it is in compliance with disclosure obligations. It is important
to understand the role and limitations of these stockwatch programs and price
query systems.
First, stockwatch programs and price query notices operate when there is
unexplained sharp short-term price or volume movement. This means that the
spectrum of disclosure events they encompass is restricted. While most regulators
of company disclosure matters do not provide explicit bright line materiality
guidance, materiality thresholds are a necessary input or variable within
stockwatch programs. As the materiality thresholds and security price movement
parameters of these programs are set at higher levels, the percentage of suspicious
trades that activate the stockwatch programs declines.
Second, all of the stockwatch processes are limited with respect to the
nature of information encompassed. Private or selective disclosure of material
223. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 US 438, 459
(1976).
224. BAFIN FIN. SUPERVISORY AUTH., ISSUER GUIDELINES 31 (Apr. 28, 2009).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. The securities exchanges and or national regulators across the countries discussed in Part III of this
Article operate stock watch programs for market surveillance purposes. While other monitoring and
supervisory processes may be in operation to ensure that companies are complying with the continuous
disclosure listing rules and/or statutory provisions, details of such processes on the websites of the security
exchanges and national regulators are limited. The scope of this Article does not allow for comprehensive
discussion on the enforcement of continuous disclosure rules in each of the jurisdictions examined.
Nonetheless, the processes discussed in Part III highlight some of the limitations of continuous disclosure
regimes.
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information is the biggest risk faced by investors who rely on public disclosures,
particularly when the disclosure events contain prospective company information.
The type of trading that can lead to gradual movement in the prices of company
securities over days or months often involve accumulating pieces of information
that feed into the estimated expected earnings of listed companies.
However, stockwatch programs are not activated when a share price reflects
materially price sensitive news gradually or in a pattern that is not immediate
and sharp.
Third, the stockwatch and query processes are limited in effect. The
programs only operate when short-term share price movement or trading volumes
suggest materially price sensitive news has not been disclosed. By this time,
uninformed investors that traded during the relevant period have already suffered
a loss (or have missed a potential gain), which means that any benefits from the
stockwatch programs are indirect at best. The stockwatch processes are only
productive for investors as a group if sustained monitoring and enforcement by
the exchange encourages companies to continuously disclose in the future or
reduces the level of disclosure omissions. Such outcomes are only likely when
regulators have the capacity to examine the circumstances underlying individual
queries and are willing and able to initiate appropriate enforcement actions when
contraventions of the disclosure listing rules occur. Benefits of stockwatch
programs are negligible when a company responds to a query indicating it has not
complied with disclosure obligations, or it makes a subsequent announcement, and
no further investigation or enforcement action is then taken by the exchange.
Finally, stockwatch processes operate on an ex post facto or hindsight basis.
When the materiality of information is determined after the event based on the
level of near term share price movement, this effectively shifts the burden to
regulators, investors, and stakeholders to establish misconduct after the event
using relatively limited tools. In effect, the stockwatch programs require
regulators to establish after an event that “inside information” was not disclosed,
as evidenced by short-term security price movement following public release of the
information.
For all of the above reasons, supervision of continuous disclosure regimes
that is limited to disclosure omissions identified by significant, unexplained, and
short-term price movements is unlikely to serve financial markets, public
corporations or global communities well over the long term. Company disclosure
regimes need to be framed positively. They should promote a culture in which open
and transparent disclosure is the expected norm—a norm that provides long-term
benefits to corporations and the countries in which they operate. Material
company information needs to be submitted to an exchange or regulatory
information repository quickly so that all investors are alerted to developments on
a timely basis. Theories or notions which suggest that listed company managers
have the capacity and wherewithal to withhold significant news from all market
participants for long periods are now largely illusory. When executives delay
public disclosure of important news or updates for a period, the probability that
the news will either be disclosed privately or will leak to institutional segments of
the market is high. And when companies make no public announcements for what
may be considered by managers as “short” periods, the level of wealth transferred
to those with advance knowledge can be immense.
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Participant incentives to obtain informational or timing advantages in
financial markets are powerful and consuming because such advantages often lead
to reliable trading gains (or reduced losses) without the need for diligent and
sophisticated analysis. Institutional participants typically compete to obtain
regular private meetings with company managers as a means to obtain the earliest
and most substantive updates between reporting periods. This battle for superior
executive access continues on a daily basis across the full spectrum of market
participants (and not simply between institutional and individual investors). The
associated power games are typically based on perceived or actual wealth and
political influence, so the financial institutions that control the largest funds or
trading portfolios hold the most sway given their voting power and greater ability
to pay or maneuver for private access. This intense gamesmanship around
privately obtained company information impacts conduct, outcomes, and
competition adversely across national and global financial markets.
Policy reports commonly acknowledge that market focus on expected
earnings results is intense.229 Indeed, the SEC changed its view on the provision
of management forecasts in the 1970s, indicating that an instrumental reason for
doing so was the realization that “very often projections were the subject matter of
selective disclosure, that is, the information was furnished to selected investors,
such as institutions or favored analysts, and was not made available to public
investors.”230 Company directors and managers are human, and they are subject
to the same personal failings and cognitive biases as everyone else. Even if the
news and signals they provide during private briefings are not explicit, body
language and disclosure omissions are often more informative than specific verbal
responses. As a respected research director stated on Australian television:
[m]ost companies are very smart these days in massaging analysts’ expectations.
You know they give you a nod and a wink and stamp their feet on the floor three
times so most of the numbers will be pretty close to what the companies report.231

Notions still abound within highly respected scholarly and policy circles that
large segments of national populations are too naïve, irrational, unsophisticated,
or inexperienced to comprehend company financial statements, disclosures, and
commentary expressed in plain terms. While this may be a convenient way to
argue that informational advantages based on perceived expertise and
professionalism should be maintained, such models do not fully accord with
empirical evidence and observation.232 Institutional and retail investors are highly
diverse and broad generalizations mask the true spectrum of professionalism,
competency, and diligence across both groups. Some institutional investors have a
poor fundamental understanding of the securities that they trade or invest in, and
some individual investors are skilled, sophisticated, and understand well the
229. E.g., KAY, supra note 12, at 64.
230. E.g., A.A. Sommer, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Forecasting: A Look at the Future
Forecasting, (Mar. 29, 1974), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1974/032974sommer.pdf.
231. Ivor Ries with a Reporting Season Forecast, Inside Business (Austrl. Broad. Corp. Television July 19,
2009).
232. E.g., Ron Kaniel, Shuming Liu, Gideon Saar, & Sheridan Titman, Individual Investor Trading and
Return Patterns around Earnings Announcements, 57 J. FIN. 639 (2012); Joshua Coval, David Hirshleifer, &
Tyler Shumway, Can Individual Investors Beat the Market? (Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 04-025,
2005).

Vol. 3, Summer 2015

221

Global Markets Law Journal
companies and securities within their portfolios. Simplistic generalizations applied
to investors that lack the political clout of large financial institutions should
therefore be seen for what they are—arguments that are constructed by those with
entrenched privileges that tilt the wealth creation processes in their favor. It is not
appropriate in contemporary markets for policy makers, regulators, or companies
to predetermine or limit the content and format of publicly available company
information based on preconceptions about the capacity and role of investors and
others.
Global communities and modern financial markets have embraced
technological change, and entire populations are increasingly dependent on digital
interfaces. To remain relevant and credible, corporate communication and
associated regulatory frameworks must reflect these momentous societal changes.
The primary tests of effective digital company reporting and communication
include the ease with which information can be sourced and downloaded online,
the quality and timeliness of publicly accessible company reports and disclosures,
and the adequacy of online facilities and forums that allow interactive dialogue
between companies, shareholders, and other stakeholders. The essence of a
company’s culture is revealed when there is negative news to report or the earnings
trend turns downward. Listed companies are generally very willing to
communicate with stakeholders publicly when things are going well and
performance trends are positive. Most are more reluctant to openly discuss
negative events and developments.233
Company managers are not always motivated to embrace available
technologies to broaden access and improve the quality of public information, so
policy makers and regulators should establish strong frameworks to encourage
disclosure of all the information needed for well-informed investor decisionmaking. Listed companies have made large cost savings during recent decades
from regulatory changes that permit electronic dissemination of reports. Some of
these savings should be redirected to harness the power of digital technologies to
enhance the quality of publicly available information.234 Investors and other
stakeholders can only make well-informed decisions if they have access to timely
and comprehensive company information in formats that are readily
understandable and which allow comparability. As a spokesman for the
Association for Investment Management and Research suggested, the “voice of the
investor has for too long been marginalized in the debates on financial reporting.
. . . [Investors] need . . . regular, comprehensive reporting of financial information.
. . . They need it in accepted formats . . . based on generally accepted accounting

233. Scholarly empirical research on disclosure consistently finds that some corporate managers attempt
to communicate bad news in ways that disguise the negative information or that overstates the optimistic
elements. Global regulators are well aware of these challenges and they repeatedly highlight the importance
of appropriate balance in the disclosure of positive and negative news.
234. Some of the printing and delivery costs that companies have saved by moving to electronic
dissemination of reports have been shifted to users of these reports. Users are required to download company
reports and information from electronic files stored on individual company websites, exchange websites, or
independent websites such as EDGAR in the United States or an RIS in Europe. The costs incurred can be
significant when corporate reports are hundreds of pages long and they contain lots of ink intensive graphs
and pictures.
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standards.”235 Companies should be encouraged to provide information on a
layered basis through public communication modes to enable all interested groups
to access relevant information when convenient. In other words, companies should
provide information in different formats, with varying degrees of detail and
complexity, to enable users to obtain information appropriate for their needs.
The provision of comprehensive information through non-discriminatory channels
does not preclude companies from providing additional summary or tailored
information where this is considered necessary or useful for some investors or
stakeholders.
V. Conclusion
Louis Brandeis famously stated more than a century ago that “sunlight is
said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”236
He argued that the potent force of publicity should be used as a continuous
remedial measure in the impending struggle for publicly disclosed information
that is real and useful for a broad audience.237 These calls by Brandeis for “light”
in financial markets and for meaningful corporate disclosure within public spheres
remain germane and important today. Indeed, public company governance and
accountability concerns that existed when company disclosure regulation was first
established are more compelling than ever given the immense scale and
importance of financial markets and large corporations within modern economies
and communities. Comprehensive and effective listed company reporting is critical
in the twenty-first century to ensure that established checks and balances can
fully operate, discourage managerial, institutional, and individual excesses that
inevitably arise in financial markets, and promote genuinely competitive markets.
However, as Brandeis emphasized, there are no easy pathways to promote or
mandate effective disclosure and communication between listed corporations and
stakeholders. Disclosure regimes are highly political and power imbalances mean
the strength and efficacy of disclosure regimes tend to be diluted over time.238
While it is easy to espouse the benefits of public transparency and accountability
in financial markets, these goals have to be sought by every community and
nation. To embed and sustain cultures of meaningful transparency and
accountability across financial markets, it is necessary to move beyond
consideration of what is merely technically or legally compliant conduct.
Section 2 of the Exchange Act indicates that securities exchange activity is
intended to enhance the “national public interest” and the NYSE’s continuous
disclosure rules require companies to provide materially price sensitive
information to shareholders and the “public”.239 The SEC, in accordance with these
aims, appears to promote public disclosure as the primary means of corporate
communication. It directs companies to provide comprehensive and timely
information to enable all interested persons to assess a company’s performance
235. Ass’n for Inv. Mgmt. & Research, European Investment Professionals Back Quarterly Reporting, PR
NEWSWIRE (Nov. 24, 2003), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/European+Investment+Professio
nals+Back+Quarterly+Reporting.-a0110452049 (italics added for emphasis).
236. LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (1914).
237. Id., ch. V.
238. See FUNG, GRAHAM, & WEIL, supra note 15, at 125-26.
239. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 4, codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1934).
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and value its securities. The financial statements in the 10-Ks and 10-Qs are
supported by comprehensive MD&A and financial notes. The content of these
reports is focused and easily dissected by readers because the SEC does not permit
companies to include pictures, disconnected commentary, or marketing material
within the 10-Qs and 10-Ks. The SEC mandated periodic reports use standard
forms that allow comparative company, sectoral and market analysis, and these
documents are accessible from the EDGAR website. The SEC processes are
transparent. Its monitoring and enforcement of the federal disclosure rules can be
readily located on the SEC website. While disclosure structures outside the United
States reflect some of these features, no other national company periodic reporting
framework is as integrated, comprehensive, or transparent. Other jurisdictions,
for various reasons, have elected to take a “lighter touch” approach with respect
to listed company periodic disclosure regulation and practice.
The most striking finding from the comparative national analysis is the
difference in approach to corporate disclosure law and practice by listed companies
in the United States and the European Commission. Serious transparency issues
have arisen in Europe over the last decade, including incomplete or inappropriate
disclosure from some Member States and some of its financial institutions.
Despite these issues, the company disclosure framework recently adopted by the
European Commission can best be characterized as a minimalist model. The 2013
Transparency Directive amendments appear to be politically motivated, as they
accord with the wishes of Member States with powerful finance sectors. The
market participants who will ultimately derive the most benefits from the recent
amendments are the largest financial institutions with the best private access to
senior executives. The value of information privately obtained from company
managers is enhanced by ambiguous or minimalistic periodic and continuous
disclosure obligations, longer public reporting periods, and cumbersome access to
comparative information. That is, private communications are most valuable in
jurisdictions where periodic reporting is restricted to half-year and preliminary
full-year reports, the required MD&A and financial notes are limited, access to
standardized company information is not available or difficult to construct,
monitoring of private meetings is minimal or non-existent, and enforcement of
selective disclosure events is unlikely. Disclosure frameworks that are
predominantly built around private exchanges and based on power, influence, or
wealth, are unlikely to be the optimal long-term framework to achieve the goals of
investor protection, market fairness, efficiency, transparency, and low systemic
risk.
Disclosure structures that encourage regular private exchanges tend to
gloss over the many conflicts and issues that arise. Private access to corporate
executives is often paid for either directly (in the form of favors such as silence,
positive commentary, or the provision of new capital) or indirectly (in the form of
fees to intermediaries such as brokers or investment banks). For instance, the
U.K.’s Financial Times reported last year that asset managers were paying large
sums of money to brokers and investment bankers for arranging meetings with
chief executive officers.240 Analysis by the Financial Services Authority found
some large asset managers were making these payments using client
240. Steve Johnson, FSA Crackdown on Cash for CEO Access, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/084a4bdc-84db-11e2-891d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3D02LvWAR.
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commissions.241 Notably, an anonymous senior figure from a large U.K. asset
manager confirmed that payments for corporate access were commonplace and
that this was “how . . . the buyside have always operated.”242 Daniel Godfrey, chief
executive of the Investment Management Association even suggested that
“[p]ayments for access to companies may be something you have to hold your nose
to do, but maybe it is in the interests of your clients to do it.”243 While asset
managers may consider the practice of paying brokers and investment bankers
large amounts of money to arrange access to company executives as “normal”, such
conduct does not encourage healthy or efficient corporate or financial market
environments.
The financial crisis of 2009244 and continuing financial challenges in some
areas of the world starkly remind the global community that the health of modern
financial markets, real economies, and the lives of individuals are entirely
interconnected. Adverse consequences arising from poor corporate disclosure are
often exacerbated during periods of sustained stress. Corporate and financial
market developments feed into the real economy, and during significant financial
crises, the economic and social costs borne by the community can be immense.
Financial markets that operate in a vacuum without clear links to the real
economy and that lack broad investor confidence and public trust eventually
falter. Liquidity and pricing issues arise and these issues lead to capital
withdrawals and higher funding costs.
Bushman and Smith define financial market transparency as “the
widespread availability of relevant, reliable information about the . . . governance,
value, and risk of publicly traded firms.”245 Accepting this as a reasonable
definition, it is periodic reports and continuous disclosures that provide the most
relevant and reliable information on publicly traded firms. It is therefore
surprising and concerning that the European Commission will operate from 2015
with a Transparency Directive that provides the public with company reports and
disclosures that are irregular, dated, and limited in content. The amended rules
require corporations to release annual reports four months after the end of the
financial year and half-year reports within three months of the end of the relevant
period. Additionally, the content and form of the preliminary full year reports
(released earlier than the annual reports) are largely discretionary. While all of
these periodic reports must include some MD&A and financial notes, companies
may reference financial measures in the MD&A sections that do not readily link
to the reported figures, nor fully comply with accounting standards. The form of
all of the reports is ad hoc and specified long-term financial performance measures
and commentary are not mandated. The usefulness and credibility of such limited
public disclosure structures are open to question, particularly when jurisdictions
encourage regular private briefings between company managers and selected
participants without obligations to webcast the briefings and without effective
monitoring and enforcement of the private exchanges.
Id.
Id.
Id.
E.g., U.S. FIN.CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 47 XXII (Jan. 2011).
Robert Bushman & Abbie Smith, Transparency, Financial Accounting Information, and Corporate
Governance, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 65, 66 (2003).
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242.
243.
244.
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All nations, including the United States, should recommit to strong public
disclosure frameworks as the primary means of substantive corporate
communication and engagement. When countries permit or encourage senior
executives and asset managers to regularly engage with selected participants
behind closed doors, this results in distinctly tiered communication channels and
accountability structures. These hierarchical structures inevitably lead to public
disclosure regimes that are weak and heavily sanitized. As Brandeis stressed,
transparency or light from public sources can only operate as an efficient monitor
and enforcer within financial markets when there are sufficiently regular,
adequate, and clear rays to enable all investors (including critics)246 and the
broader community to respond to developing events. Company disclosure regimes
work best when listed companies adopt a normative culture of continuous public
disclosure. Such cultures are only possible when directors and senior executives
acknowledge the substantive benefits derived from timely and frank
communication about their company’s developments and performance. Long-term
benefits derived from corporate disclosure regimes rely on broad participation,
investor confidence, and continued public trust in the integrity of financial
markets.247 Such confidence is generated by giving legal weight to principles and
rules that provide all participants with a right to comprehensive information on a
timely basis and that ensure minority shareholders’ rights are protected and
market misconduct is enforced.

246. Companies can exclude or blacklist investors from private meetings who criticise, ask penetrating
questions, or publish a sell recommendation. E.g., John Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule of Social
and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2003); COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, HIH ROYAL
COMMISSION, THE FAILURE OF HIH INSURANCE 72-73 (2003); DAVID EINHORN, FOOLING SOME OF THE PEOPLE
ALL OF THE TIME: A LONG SHORT STORY (JOHN WILEY & SONS, 2008); Robert Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market
Regulatory Failure and the Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORPS. L. 363, 365 (2009).
247. See U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N REPORT, supra note 244. The Report notes at [xxii] that the
“integrity of our financial markets and the public’s trust in those markets are essential to the economic wellbeing of . . . [a] nation.” Id.
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